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AN INFORMATION-GATHERING APPROACH
TO COPYRIGHT POLICY
Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag*

ABSTRACT
For over a century and with increasing frequency, major
controversies have erupted between large distributors of copyrighted
works (songpublishers, movie studios, record labels, book publishers, etc.)
and makers of new technologies for experiencing those works (player
piano manufacturers, VCR manufacturers, the creators of file sharing
software, Google Books, etc.). Usually, the copyright owners and the
technology firms reach a licensing deal-but not without some form of
government intervention. Various institutions within the federal
government have become involved in these disputes, using a variety of
different mechanisms. This Article is a theoretical investigation of
government intervention in these content-technology copyright disputes.
We analyze government institutions based on the relative ability of each
one to gather information about the impact of new technology, the
positive and negative consequences of using these institutions in
combination, the most favorable time for each institution to intervene
during the course of a dispute, and the track record of each institution's
success or failure in the copyright context. We argue that some
government actions might be able to facilitate, hasten, or otherwise
encourage a licensing deal, whereas other government actions might be
counterproductive on those dimensions. We then apply ourframework to
disputes between copyright owners andfour technologies as case studies to
illustrate the theory: piano rolls, radio, VCRs, and webcasting. Each case
study explains in detail the many government institutionsthat intervened
in each dispute, describes the governmental and private actions
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chronologically, and reflects on the lessons learned from each set of
government interventions. Some of the case studies arefamiliar,but many
important details about the nature of various government institutions'
intervention have been underappreciated. The dispute over webcasting
royalties is less familiar, motivating a comprehensive discussion of the
complicated government role in webcasting. The ultimate goal of the
Article is to characterize what policy tools should be used to resolve
content-technology disputes and when those tools should be deployed. We
hope that our framework can be a guide to policymakers within the
various governmental institutions currently involved in copyrightpolicy.
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INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the last century, the music publishers selling sheet
music came into conflict with the manufacturers of a new technological
device, the piano roll.1 In the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s, the music
publishers clashed with radio companies.2 In the 1970s and 1980s, the
movie studios fought with the makers of videocassette recorders
(VCRs).3 In the early 2000s, the record labels resisted digital distribution
of music and sought to squelch or otherwise control the software
companies that offered file sharing software.4 Copyright scholars will
find these examples of conflicts between copyright owners and new
technology familiar, perhaps even oppressively so. Nonetheless,
recounting these and other most famous copyright battles over new
technology reminds us of important facts. Each new technology of
copying and distribution since the printing press has presented both
I See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (ruling on whether
mechanical piano players violated the then-existing copyright act); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET (2001); RUSSELL SANJEK
& DAVID SANJEK, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN: THE AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996); Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 278 (2004).
2 See SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 50, 152-56, 253-54.
3 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); LITMAN, supra
note 1, at 131.
4 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding
one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright is liable
for resulting infringing acts by third parties); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th
Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's grant of preliminary injunction in favor of recording
industry copyright owners against a website operator); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (ruling on contributory and vicarious copyright infringement claims);
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting
summary judgment to copyright owners against an Internet company).
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challenges and opportunities. New disputes at the intersection of
copyright and technology arise every single year as new technologies
and new business practices challenge the status quo. And each time,
various government institutions have participated in resolving or
exacerbating the conflict, with different branches and agencies
interacting in complicated ways. How these past conflicts are
understood shapes copyright policy in the present, which in turn
determines whether new technologies will survive, and if so, under what
terms.
Previous theoretical work on copyright policy has focused on either
the strategic interaction between content and technology industries or
on the allocation of property rights among copyright owners,
technology companies, and the public. We seek to augment the twoplayer conception of these disputes and to supplement the propertyrights framework with a detailed analysis of the government institutions
that create, monitor, and enforce property rights.5 Our approach
provides a connection between the substance of copyright policy, given
by the property rights framework, and the process of making copyright
policy, based on the capabilities of various government institutions. Our
account of government institutions' capabilities incorporates key
insights from the public choice school that describe, in the abstract, the
limitations and failures of what government institutions can achieve in
practice.6
In this Article, we study the role of government in addressing
content-technology disputes. We address four key questions: Which
government institutions should act in response to which kinds of
disputes? What combination of policy tools should those institutions
deploy? At what times and in what sequence should those institutions
deploy them? And which policy tools, in which combinations, have
succeeded or failed?
This Article sets out a new theoretical framework for assessing the
role of government in resolving the content-technology disputes that

5 Tim Wu also takes a dynamic, government-policy-focused view of copyright disputes.
See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES

(2010). He has argued that rather than looking at copyright as solely encouraging or restricting
authorship, scholars must also focus on the role of copyright in regulating competition among
rival disseminators. See Wu, supra note 1. In this Article, we aim to build on Wu's insights to
survey the multifarious government institutions that regulate disputes between copyright
owners and disseminators, analyze the interplay of those institutions' actions, and determine
what combinations of government actions have been beneficial or detrimental in the past.
6 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (providing the

seminal account of public choice theory). Predictions about what government institutions will
actually do in a particular situation must also be informed by a more realistic account of
political behavior, down to the level of individual actors and their idiosyncratic motivationssomething this Article does not attempt. For such an account of the role of public choice in
action in the context of copyright policymaking, see LITMAN, supra note 1.
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are the recurring narrative of copyright law. We support our theoretical
analysis with detailed case studies ranging from disputes over player
pianos to MP3 players. Despite our emphasis on historical accounts of
copyright controversies, the ultimate goal of our Article is normative;
we make several evaluative and prescriptive claims. In terms of
evaluation, we discuss our view of the successful and unsuccessful
aspects of previous attempts at government intervention in contenttechnology disputes. Prescriptively, we provide a framework for
thinking of copyright policy toward content-technology disputes
between copyright holders, incumbent distributors (if applicable), and
new technologists. Our main insights, as we see them, are twofold. First,
the government's problem is best understood as an informational
problem rather than a distributional problem. Second, with a clear view
of what is known how different policy tools operate, we can offer a
framework with which policymakers can choose policies that serve as
useful catalysts to spur private licensing deals between copyright
distributors and makers of new technologies.
Part I describes our theoretical framework. Part II includes four
case studies, applying our framework to disputes between: publishers
and piano roll manufacturers, ASCAP and radio broadcasters, movie
studios and VCR manufacturers, and record labels and webcasters. Part
III concludes and offers some reflections on current issues, such as the
Google Book Search dispute and the controversy over the ill-fated Stop
Online Piracy Act (SOPA).
I. THEORY
This Part describes the theoretical framework for the Article, which
we will later bring to a series of detailed case studies of particular
controversies in the history of copyright policy. Section A explains our
terminology and the scope of our inquiry. Section B describes how our
ideas relate to the previous literature on copyright policy. Finally,
Section C describes the many government institutions that conduct
copyright policy and explains our information-focused approach to
understanding these institutions and their actions.
A.

Content-Technology Disputes

This Article focuses on a specific category of controversies that we
will call "content-technology disputes." On one side of each such
dispute is a set of firms making a new type of technology, whether
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hardware or software, that can be used to distribute copyrighted works.7
The very emergence of the new technology and the firms seeking to
offer products or services based on that technology creates the potential
for conflict. On the other side is a set of copyright-holding firms that
distribute copyrighted works, such as movie studios, record labels, and
book publishers.8 Thus, we mean to describe large-scale disputes
between entire industries, whether existing or nascent. Although it is
conventional to conceive of these disputes as two-player games, where
copyright holders control the current means of distribution, reality is
often more complicated. In many instances, there is a third set of firms
with a strong interest at stake: firms that employ the incumbent
technologies that have previously been used to distribute copyrighted
works. In sum, content-technology disputes occur among new
technologists, distributors, and in some instances incumbent
technologists as well.
Given the participants and interested parties, what are contenttechnology disputes ultimately about? Broadly speaking, the disputes
concern two questions. First, what technologies will be used to
disseminate a particular type of copyrighted works? Second, if the
answer to the first question permits the new technology a lawful
existence, what licensing structure and fees, if any, will exist between the
copyright holders and the new technologists? In short, these disputes are
about which new technologies will emerge and under what terms they
will be allowed to proceed.
The intervention of one or more branches of government is a
recurring feature in these content-technology disputes. In part, this is
because such disputes are often a product of market failure. We can
identify five types of market failure that seem most relevant to this
context. First, there may be holdout problems, because every large
copyright distributor is needed for the technology to take off.9 Second,
content-technology negotiations may have negative externalities, in that
while the companies dispute, users cannot get the new technologies.o
Third, there is the danger of collusion between copyright distributors
and incumbent technologists-a famous example is the way program
producers and television broadcasters worked together to delay the

7 Even if only one firm is sued as part of a content-technology dispute, economically
speaking, other firms with similar technology have a strong interest in that litigation.
8 Copyright holders often engage in content-technology disputes as a group, often through
a trade organization such as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) or the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA).
9 Cf. Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The Holdout Problem, Urban Sprawl, and Eminent
Domain, 16 J. HOUSING ECON. 309, 311-12 (2007) (explaining the holdout problem).
10 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1081-85 (2005) (explaining the general concept and different categories of
externalities).
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entry of cable television for two decades.", Fourth, there is also a
possibility of collusion among the copyright distributors; for example,
copyright owners may seek to license only one company out of several
competitors in the new technology.12 Fifth, and finally, bargaining
failure is possible because of asymmetric and potentially faulty
information-there may be no overlap in the ranges of licensing terms
to which the parties are willing to agree.13 This last market failure
especially is exacerbated by the presence of statutory damages in
copyright, which gives the copyright distributors a large, and often
disproportionate, threat against the new technologists. On the other
side, the prospect of bargaining failure is heightened by the difficulty of
enforcement for copyright owners, which can make the status quo
tolerable or even appealing to technologists.
The emergence of a new technology does not necessarily create
conflicts. No significant upheaval arises in those rare instances when
content owners are also the inventors of a new copyright technology.
For example, the encryption technology that protects DVDs was
technology created to serve the current industry's business model, not to
challenge it. The DVD succeeded as a format because the leap forward
in image and sound quality made consumers willing to tolerate copy
restrictions. In contrast, the Secure Digital Music Initiative's attempt to
deploy technology that would facilitate copy protection failed because,
from a consumer's point of view, the technology offered reduced
functionality with no offsetting benefits. 14 However, due to its potential
to disrupt the status quo, new copyright technology is almost never
developed by the dominant content owners of the day. New
technologies for the dissemination of copyrighted works, by their very
nature, tend to come from outsiders.
Government actors from the executive branch, Congress, and the
judiciary play a key role in providing solutions to these conflicts.
Sometimes government actors play their roles well and the results are
productive, other times, not so much. When we refer to government
action, we mean to refer to any government action, even actions that lie
in the background and mainly facilitate the operation of a private
market for copyright licenses. Thus, we mean to include Congress
defining property rights through the Copyright Act in our taxonomy of
the governmental mechanisms of copyright policy. Of course, we also
11 Wu, supra note 1, at 311-24 (recounting the history of regulation of the cable industry).
12 See infra Part II.A (describing this situation in the piano roll industry).
13 See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 42-44 (2010) (describing bargaining failure of this sort

and suggesting a behavioral explanation).
14 See, e.g., STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION: THE SPECTACULAR CRASH

OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 150-56 (2009) (telling the story of the SDMI

initiative's failure).
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mean to include Congress setting the rate of a compulsory license as an
intervention. In other words, we will speak of different types of
government policies rather than the absence or presence of government
involvement. We know of no examples in copyright policy in which the
government had no role of any kind at any point in the timeline of a
content-technology dispute. Thus, we seek to employ the discourse of
different kinds and perhaps different degrees of government
intervention while eschewing black-and-white terminology. 15
Government intervention is also a recurring feature of contenttechnology disputes because the arrival of new technology almost
invariably creates legal uncertainty, market instability, or both. Since
1790, the Copyright Act has vested exclusive rights in authors. However,
the congressionally defined scope of copyrights has changed
significantly over time and the scope of those rights is often ambiguous.
New technologies of copying and distribution don't just upset the
market equilibrium; they expose uncertainties and inadequacies in the
existing legal regime. In such instances, the question of whether the new
technology firms have infringed copyrights-or, more commonly,
whether new technology firms have secondary liability because their
products or services allow users to infringe copyrights-has an
uncertain answer. Moreover, even when the descriptive scope of
copyright is clear (i.e., all sides agree on what the law allows), the
normative scope of copyright (i.e., what the law should be) remains
contentious.
Out of that legal uncertainty,16 a wide range of governmental
institutions can enter the mix, with various mechanisms at their
disposal. To take a very common example, the federal courts may have
to decide a case between a set of copyright-holding plaintiffs and a
defendant firm that has offered a new distribution technology.
Alternatively, the Copyright Office may engage in administrative
rulemaking on gaps in or difficulties with the Copyright Act.17 The
federal antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), may engage in scrutiny of the
copyright holders, especially to the extent those firms engage as a group
in content-technology disputes.

15 Cf JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM (1994) (advocating a more modest, more contingent language in which to discuss
law and economics).
16 Cf Ben Depoorter, Technology & Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1831 (2009) (discussing legal uncertainty as the result of congressional delays in
updating the law to catch up with technological change).
17 The Copyright Office is a department of the Library of Congress, which is a legislative
agency (and thus reports to and supports Congress in the vast organizational chart of the
federal government).
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These are just the simplest examples; many other governmental
mechanisms, some quite novel and complicated, have been used to
resolve content-technology disputes. And new approaches are always
possible. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive or free of interagency conflict.
B.

The PropertyRights Framework

Much of the policy discourse about copyright concerns the
allocation of property rights. Using Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed's celebrated framework of property rules and liability rules,
commentators characterize the protection awarded to copyright owners
or the rights reserved to the public.18 Property discourse tends to focus
on rights in relation to things-Blackacre, for example-but in the case
of intellectual property it is more productive to think of rights allocated
for certain uses. The property rule conception of copyright is reflected
in the exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act.19
Those with an entitlement protected by a property rule can name their
price for any transfer and retain control-they can choose not to sell. In
contrast, those with an entitlement protected by a liability rule cannot
name their price or prevent others from using the resource-they have
the right to a government-determined fee but no control over the
resource. The copyright code contains several compulsory licenses: for
mechanical reproductions of musical works,20 for webcasts of sound
recordings,21 for cable retransmission of television programs, 22 and so
on. The code also contains several exceptions to copyright protection.
One can think of these doctrines-such as fair use, 2 3 exceptions for
libraries,24 first sale,25 and exceptions to the public performance
right26-as Congress giving the public the entitlement to certain uses
and protecting them with a property rule.27

18 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
19 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce,
prepare derivative works from, distribute, publicly perform, and publicly display their works).
20 Id. § 115(a)(2).
21 Id. § 114(d)(2).
22 Id. § 111(d)(1).
23 Id. § 107.
24 Id. § 108.
25 Id. § 109(a).
26 See, e.g., id. § 110(5)(A) (exempting transmitted performances or displays received "on a
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes" from infringement as
long as there is no financial charge and no retransmission).
27 This is much like saying you have a right to walk on a public street because no law says
otherwise.
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Robert Merges added a new wrinkle to this property-rule/liabilityrule framework by noting that copyright owners, even when they are
given exclusive property rights over certain uses, can nonetheless
contract into liability rules.28 Performing rights organizations take this
approach in the way they aggregate the rights of individual owners of
musical composition copyrights, typically original composers or music
publishers.29 The three main performing rights organizations, the
American Society of Composers, Arrangers, and Publishers (ASCAP),
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and the SESAC, Inc. (SESAC), offer
blanket licenses to radio stations, concert venues, restaurants, and
others who wish to perform musical works publicly. For example, an
individual songwriter who participates in ASCAP contracts into a
liability rule system; she waives the right to refuse individual licensees
and commits to authorizing anyone willing to pay the externally
determined scheduled fee. Law and economics scholars have admired
the performing rights organization solution as a way to reduce
transaction costs without resorting to government price-setting.30 Each
blanket license offered by a performance rights organization (PRO) acts
as a switchboard between, for example, over ten thousand radio stations
and hundreds of thousands of publishers and composers. It is common
to regard PROs and similar institutions as spontaneous market solutions
to the problem of transaction costs. We agree that PROs are a solution,
but the literature has largely overlooked the role of the government in
making such private ordering possible.31
Another dimension of rights allocation is the distinction between
opt-in rules and opt-out rules. In the proposed (and ultimately rejected)
Google Books Settlement, owners of book copyrights would have been
required to opt out of the Book Rights Registry.32 By contrast, the
performing rights organizations represent a kind of opt-in regime, in
which composition copyright owners opt in to a blanket-licensing
28 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CALIF. L.REV. 1293 (1996).
29 See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF
DIGITAL SAMPLING 76-77, 82-84 (2011) (summarizing the role of publishers in the music

industry and their contractual relationship with songwriters and composers).
30 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & K.A.D. Camara, The Tragedy of the Human Commons, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 502, 502-03 n.85 (2007) (describing the performing rights organizations
as a potential model for a health care clearinghouse).
31 For example, Robert Merges, in his widely cited commentary, describes ASCAP's
beginnings as "cost-spreading club for copyright litigation" and treats antitrust enforcement as
an afterthought. See Merges, supra note 28, at 1330. He regards the resulting court supervision
of ASCAP charges as something that "merely formalized long standing ASCAP procedures for
resolving member and licensee disputes." Id. at 1340.
32 See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting a
proposed settlement); see also Hal R. Varian, The Google Library Project 15-16 (Feb. 10, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-hal/Papers/2006/
google-library.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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scheme. Merges has called attention to waiver as another dimension of
property rights analysis; the idea of waiver relates closely to the idea of
opt-in. 33 The possibility of waiver gives owners of property rights
flexibility, but the requirement to opt in could cut into copyright
owners' control if taken too far.34 As Tim Wu has observed, waiver,
non-enforcement, or other manifestations of "tolerated use" are an
important feature on copyright's landscape. Through tolerated uses,
such as fan fiction, copyright owners leave certain uses to the public
without formally renouncing their rights.35 The DMCA safe harbors
facilitate pervasive tolerated use in connection with social media
because, for a copyright owner to take action against an online service
provider such as YouTube, it must first provide notice of an alleged
infringement. Upon receipt of such notice, the service provider must
take down the accused content or lose safe harbor protection.36
Commons management schemes are another essential aspect of the
allocation and design of property rights in copyright law. Scholars over
the past decade have increasingly emphasized that individual rights are
not the only way to grant property rights.37 This approach has shed light
on all aspects of the nature of property. Thinking about the commons
has also prompted thinking about its opposite, the anticommons, in
which too many entities have rights to the same resource, rendering it
difficult or impossible to use the resource. 38 Another aspect of
"commons thinking," in terms of expanding beyond individuals and
competition, is a new recognition of collaborative production, such as
open source software or Wikipedia, and the property rights regimes that
can best enable it.39
These important ideas about property rights have given
commentators and policymakers a way to understand copyright law,

33 Robert P. Merges, To Waive and Waive Not 13, 15-17 (Apr. 2, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1854731.
34 Id. at 17-19.
35 Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 620-21 (2008).
36 Id. at 621; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2006) (describing the DMCA's notice and takedown
regime for service providers that store information "at the direction of a user"). Another
example is the process by which a copyright owner can object to a non-profit performance by
giving notice. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)(B).
37 BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES

61-116 (2012); Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities:Information as
a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 117-21 (2003); Michael J.
Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the
CulturalEnvironment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 659 (2010).
38 MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.

Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698 (1998).
39 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
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along with many other areas of law. The property-rights view has led to
many useful insights and policy recommendations.40 In this Article, we
build on the property-rights framework to discuss the government
institutions that create, monitor, and enforce property rights. Part of
our contribution in this Article lies in making the connection between
the substance of copyright policy, given by the property rights
framework, and the process of copyright policy, based in the capabilities
of various government institutions.
Thus, our focus in this Article is an institutional one. Other
intellectual property scholars have addressed institutional aspects of
copyright policy, highlighting different dimensions of the copyright
lawmaking process. Jessica Litman has described the history of
copyright policymaking41 and, in light of that history, has made
recommendations about who should participate in copyright
policymaking42 and how copyright statutes should be written in order to
be comprehensible to the public.43 Pamela Samuelson and a team of
academic and practitioner experts have offered many constructive and
appealing suggestions for copyright reform, which include
recommendations specifically for Congress,44 the Copyright Office,45
and the courts. 46 Other examples of institutional perspectives come
from patent law scholarship. Commentators have considered whether
patent law needs specialized trial courts. 47 Others have questioned
whether patent law needs to adopt a regulatory model and apply
administrative law principles.48 In advance of recent statutory reforms
to patent law, Liza Vertinsky developed a framework for choosing the

40 See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Tradeoff PropertyRules, Liability Rules,
and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 1000-07 (2012) (analyzing a model
with two players with a small dynamic component allowing for one-time modification of
entitlements).
41 See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 1, at 35-63,122-45.
42 Id. at 184-86 (arguing that relying on industry players to negotiate copyright reform on
their own is unlikely to succeed in serving the public interest).
43 Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOwA L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2010) (advocating
reforms to simplify copyright law to better facilitate public understanding and navigation of it).
44 Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1193-95 (2010) (discussing statutory reforms with which Congress
could deal with content-technology disputes).
45 Id. at 1202-08 (discussing several administrative reforms the Copyright Office itself
could undertake).
46 See, e.g., id. at 1223-26 (discussing injunctive relief reforms for courts to make).
47 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001) (reporting the results of an empirical study of district judges' error
rates in patent cases); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization
in Patent Litigation?,82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 766 (2000).
48 See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (2011); Stuart Minor
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from
AdministrativeLaw, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007).
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appropriate institution to make various changes in patent law.49 Perhaps
the most direct precedent for our approach, methodologically speaking,
is Arti Rai's study of which institutions have are best suited to do patent
policymaking.50 Another important influence is Philip Weiser's work on
telecommunications policy.51
Like the studies described in the previous paragraph, this Article
aims to take the insights of property rights theory and consider them in
their dynamic institutional context. Concepts that model the solutions
to copyright controversies-such as property rules versus liability rules,
opt in versus opt out, and individual rights versus commons regimesare essential. But they do not tell the whole story. The property rights
regime that will regulate relations among copyright owners,
technologists, and the public must be chosen and evaluated at particular
points in time based on the information available to the relevant
policymakers and government institutions. The content-technology
disputes that we focus on in this Article are inevitably impacted by
decisions by policymakers. Thus, analyzing the hybrid public-private
way that content-technology disputes are resolved requires a robust
sense of which government institutions have what information at what
time during the course of these disputes.
Our explicit focus on institutional capacity and information flows
should not be taken to suggest that prior property rights theorists lacked
any sense of institutional context or the role of information. Rather, our
view is that these institutional considerations have been left implicit. For
example, many commentators favor property-rule protection precisely
because they fear that elected representatives or other government
officials will lack adequate information to set liability rules correctly.52
But this is a static, black-and-white model of information in which the
regulated entities have better information by assumption, and the
government is always trailing behind. Even if the resolution to a
content-technology dispute will center on a private negotiation, various
government institutions are going to provide the settings in which that
negotiation initially takes place and in which private contracts are
enforced down the road. Similarly, those commentators who favor

49 Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 501 (2010).
50 Arti K. Rai, EngagingFacts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent System
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003).
51 Philip J. Weiser, Regulatory Challenges and Models of Regulation, 2 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 1, 2 (2003) (describing four different regulatory strategies, each employing
different institutions).
52 See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, On CoordinatingTransactions in Intellectual Property: A Response
to Smith's DelineatingEntitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 102 (2007)
(expressing a preference for private parties to control uses of intellectual property because
others "cannot know ex ante who will be best for that role").
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liability-rule protection for intellectual property also tend to focus on
the effect on bargaining between private parties, rather than the
government institutions that must administer disputes.53 This approach
needs to be augmented by a discussion of what government institutions
would best develop and administer the compulsory license.
Property rights solutions are not like wind-up toys in this context.
As the case studies reviewed in this Article demonstrate, achieving the
desired allocation of rights can require government participation at the
start to set up the system and on a continuing basis to maintain the
system. For example, as Part II.B will discuss in more detail, the birth of
the performing rights organizations' blanket licensing solution came on
the heels of two decades' worth of antitrust investigations by the
Department of Justice. Moreover, the ASCAP and BMI blanket licenses
are-still!-subject to a consent decree administered by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.54 Owners of composition
copyrights may have contracted into a liability rule.55 But they did so
under government pressure and they have maintained the scheme
thanks in part to government supervision. There appears to be an
important layer of public ordering undergirding what is commonly
regarded simply as a private ordering solution.56 This is not to take
anything away from the success of blanket licensing. On the contrary,
our point is to provide a full picture of the origins of blanket licensing so
that the mechanism can be properly understood if it is to be replicated
to solve other content-technology disputes.
In this Article, we focus on the aspects of copyright policy that seek
to resolve content-technology disputes in a way that benefits the public.
For this task, we claim that a more general model of time and
information and an accurately complex portrayal of the public-private
nature of the policy tools will aid understanding of copyright policy. We
outline this framework in the next section.

53 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 395, 412-17 (2005) (describing a compulsory license for ideas).
54 See Daniel A. Crane, Bargainingin the Shadow ofRate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
307, 310-11 (2009) (describing the rate-setting court for the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees).
55 See Merges, supra note 28, at 1295-96.
56 There is a passage by Elinor Ostrom regarding institutional solutions to commons
problems that we think applies to institutional solutions to content-technology disputes as well:
"Institutions are rarely private or public-'the market' or 'the state.' Many successful
[common-pool resources] institutions are rich mixtures of 'private-like' and 'public-like'
institutions defying classification in a sterile dichotomy." ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS 14 (1990). We thank Arti Rai for suggesting this connection.
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Information and the InstitutionsMaking Copyright Policy

Consider in the abstract how a copyright dispute breaks out. A
technologist has developed a new method for distributing and
experiencing copyrighted works. The technologist has a choice: seek
licenses before releasing its product or simply launch the product
without licensing.57 If the technologist seeks a license, then the content
owners have two choices: negotiate or refuse. Should negotiations
succeed and a license be achieved, then there is no controversy. But if
negotiations drag on for a substantial period of time, the interaction
begins to look like a dispute. And if the content owners refuse to
negotiate at all, a dispute will result unless the technologist folds. In the
event of protracted or refused negotiations, the technologist has several
options. It can release its technology regardless of lacking permission. It
can redesign its product to reduce the likelihood of being found liable
for direct or contributory infringement. It can seek government
intervention. Or the technologist can pursue all these strategies at once.
One can also follow the other branch, in which the technologist
chooses to operate without licenses. The content owners can confront
an unlicensed technology in several ways. They can continue or restart
negotiations. They can sue the technologist for copyright infringement,
whether for direct infringement, secondary liability, or both. They can
develop their own competing technology, perhaps needing to invent
around the technologist's patent. They can also seek government
intervention. Different content owners may choose any or all of these
strategies at once.58
The key point of the preceding outline of the game play between
content owners and technologists is to illustrate that seeking state
intervention is one strategy among a portfolio of tactics that disputants
in content-technology disputes can employ simultaneous to other
tactics. It would be misleading, of course, to refer to the government as a
monolithic entity. The disputants might approach Congress, the
Copyright Office, the Department of Justice, the White House, or some
subset of these government institutions.59 Disputants can also pursue
57 Cf John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent
Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003) (reporting based on interviews with researchers that
interviewees choose among "licensing, inventing around patents, going offshore, the
development and use of public databases and research tools, court challenges, and simply using
the technology without a license (i.e., infringement)" (emphasis added)).
58 In copyright, content owners tend to coordinate on litigation and lobbying, often
through trade organizations like the RIAA and the MPAA.
59 Disputants may even seek to have the Government bind itself to certain rules in the
international arena by lobbying the U.S. Trade Representative. See, e.g., Warren Newberry,
Comment, Copyright Reform in China: A "TRIPS" Much Shorter and Less Strange Than
Imagined?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1427-28 (2003) (describing such lobbying efforts).
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lawsuits in combination with other tactics as one part of a broader
strategy. In this context, litigation is simply another tactic that happens
to involve the courts, which can be brought into this framework as
simply a specific type of government institution.
We are interested in the moments at which government
institutions are either asked, or required, to become involved in
content-technology disputes. Moreover, to take a dynamic perspective,
we want to consider the ways in which some government institutions
remain involved in, or come in and out of, content-technology disputes.
What information does each particular government institution have at
the moment it becomes involved in a dispute? What information can
each government institution obtain, and how quickly? How can the
different government institutions work in combination? Which policy
tools in what combination have worked the best to resolve contenttechnology disputes?
1.

Congress

Congress can attempt to address content-technology disputes
before they happen by passing legislation. By defining the scope of
copyright owners' exclusive rights broadly enough, Congress could try
to cover uses of copyrighted works that will eventually occur with the
aid of new technologies. In this way, Congress can try to designate
copyright holders as the winners in future conflicts with new
technologists. At the opposite extreme, Congress can craft broad
privileges intended to exempt any new-technology uses. These
approaches to legislation would put one party or another in control of
future disputes. The party with statutory leverage would most likely
dictate the terms of the resolution of any dispute. For example, if
Congress granted copyright holders broad statutory rights, it would be
more likely that copyright holders have the power to deny licenses to
new technologists and to shape licensing terms. In short, Congress
could try to define property rights and leave the parties to bargain in the
shadow of those rights.60
In practice, Congress has chosen the path of giving broad rights to
copyright owners, but with a modification. Since at least the Copyright
Act of 1976, the exclusive rights of copyright owners have been phrased
in general terms and subject to typically narrow exceptions benefiting
those technology interests powerful enough to be at the bargaining

60 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bargainingin the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasini, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 605 (2003) ("Copyright law often provides the background rules
against which bargaining over rights in works of information takes place.").
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table.61 An informational perspective explains the drawbacks of this
approach. The principal methods for gathering information to draft
copyright legislation have been private conferences62 and congressional
hearings.63 Parties could, in theory, provide a great deal of up-to-date
information both informally in conferences and formally in written
testimony. On the other hand, the information Congress receives
through these tools is limited by the set of parties invited to
participate.64 As a result, the granting of broad rights with narrow
exceptions gives short shrift to third parties who may also deserve
exceptions but are outsiders to these negotiations. Moreover, the
information conveyed at these conferences and hearings typically takes
the form of lobbying positions rather than social scientific or business
studies.65 Another problem is that even the precise definition of
property rights by Congress can leave legal uncertainty that may even
impede private bargaining.66 The deficiencies of this approach explain
why so much copyright policy is developed by the courts in either (i)
their application and refinement of the general limits of the rights of the
copyright owner, such as the idea-expression distinction and the fair use
doctrine; or (ii) the declaration of entirely non-statutory sources of
liability such as contributory liability, vicarious liability and liability for
inducing copyright infringement.67
A distinct approach to copyright legislation is for Congress itself to
craft the terms of the agreement between content owners and
technologists. Congress can write a statute laying out the conditions
under which new technologists may license a certain class of
copyrighted works.68 As described above, compulsory licenses give
copyright owners neither the right to deny a license nor the right to
name their own price. Congress can set the licensing rates itself, or it can
set up an administrative entity that will set rates. 69 Even if Congress sets

61 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv.
275, 317-23 (1989) (describing the historical development of the Copyright Act of 1976 as a
pattern of broad rights and narrow exceptions).
62 See id. at 284-85 (describing private conferences held at the urging of the Librarian of
Congress and with Congress's unofficial blessing).
63 See, e.g., id. at 293-94.
64 See id. at 299 (discussing the fact of "absent competitors" in legislative negotiations).
65 Cf JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 205-07

(2008) (describing intellectual property policy as an "evidence-free zone").
66 Cf Carol Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2199 (1997) ("Sharply
defined property rights may allow the process of contracting to begin, but those very rights may
also impede the further course of contracting.").
67 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(announcing the principle of liability for "inducing" a third party to commit copyright
infringement).
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006) (establishing a compulsory license for musical
compositions).
69 See id. § 114(f) (establishing Copyright Royalty Judges for webcasting rates).
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up a compulsory license, however, parties may bargain around those
rates. 70 Perhaps more ambitiously, Congress can set up a tax-andsubsidy scheme to transfer money from new technologists (and their
customers) to copyright holders.71 In this event, the parties cannot
contract around the legislative scheme.72 Some policy recommendations
from copyright scholars would also fall into this category, such as
proposals to replace all of copyright for music and movies with a tax and
subsidy scheme.73
Both compulsory licensing and tax-and-subsidy schemes call for
Congress to have more specific information. Neither solution allows
legislators to remain agnostic about the licensing fee between content
owners and technologists. Instead, these solutions require information
about royalty rates and the specific recipients of those rates. The Audio
Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA) provides an example of the
challenges facing this approach.74 Anticipating that digital audio tape
(DAT)-at that time a new technology-would allow near-perfect
copies of compact discs and cannibalize sales, Congress instituted a tax
of 2% on DAT recorders and other "digital audio recording devices" as
well as a tax of 3% on DATs and other recordable media.75 The statutory
scheme involves the following payments: 38.4% to sound recording
copyright owners (usually record labels), 25.6% to featured recording
artists, approximately 16.7% to music publishers, approximately 16.7%
to composers and songwriters, 1.75% to the American Federation of
Musicians, and approximately 0.92% to the American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists.76 In short, Congress set up an exquisitely
detailed scheme.
For the AHRA tax rates to raise the desired amount of revenue,
Congress would have needed accurate information about the supply of

70 See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 213-14

(7th ed. 2009) (explaining that parties usually bargain around the section 115 statutory license).
71 See 17 U.S.C. § 1003-07 (establishing a royalty scheme for certain types of digital
recording media).
72 See id. § 1003(a) ("No person shall import into and distribute, or manufacture and
distribute, any digital audio recording device or digital audio recording medium unless such
person records the notice specified by this section and subsequently deposits the statements of
account and applicable royalty payments for such device or medium specified in section 1004."
(emphasis added)).
73 See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF

ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy
to Allow Free Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing, 17 HARY. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37-59 (2003).
74 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10).
75 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-04.
76 The numbers here are provided as approximate percentages of the total amount of
royalties, but technically the payments are separated into two funds, with sound recording
copyrights receiving two-thirds of the total and musical work copyrights receiving the other
one-third. See id. § 1006(b) (describing the royalty payments into the Sound Recordings Fund
and the Musical Works Fund).
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DAT recorders and DATs, consumer demand for these products, and
the likely behavioral responses to the taxes. The royalty shares should
have reflected, at least in part, a calculation based on information about
necessary incentives for creation and distribution by intermediaries.
Alternatively, the royalty shares might have a rational basis in replacing
anticipated declines in revenue due to digital media. Of course, no such
analysis took place. Instead, the tax rates and royalty shares reflected a
political compromise. And the AHRA was a failure, as technological
uncertainty resolved itself in favor of other technologies not included in
the scheme, notably computers, MP3 files, and Internet connections.
Our information-focused approach provides a simple explanation:
Congress did not have the proper economic or technical information at
its disposal when it constructed the AHRA.77 This resulted in a failed
attempt to anticipate changes to the market for music with a detailed
rule. 78
Another important approach Congress can take in response to
content-technology disputes is to leave things ambiguous. It can
accomplish this through silence, vagueness, or contradiction. This is not
just a residual category or necessarily a mere default choice. Congress
may deliberately choose this option, perhaps as a way to encourage
negotiations that could occur on even footing.79 Or perhaps Congress
wants to let another governmental institution address the problem
first.80 As a part of this non-legislative avenue, Congress might attempt
to use "soft power," whether through hearings, formal letters, or
informal communication. 81

77 See Andrea Sloan Pink, Comment, Copyright Infringement Post Isoquantic Shift: Should
Bulletin Board Services Be Liable?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 587, 595 (1995) (describing AHRA as a
failure and mentioning new technologies for distributing music that arose just three years after
the Act's passage).
78 This relates to the classic problem of rules versus standards. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383-85 (1985) (explaining the rules versus standards
debate as a dialectic and providing an illustration in the context of deterrence).
79 See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New StructuralAnalysis of Copyright's Fair Use
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 401-02 (2005) (describing the fair use
doctrine as an illustration of Congress rationally and expediently choosing to enact incomplete
policies). See generally Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politicsand Economics in Explaining Variation
in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (2009) (reviewing the positive
political theory literature on the effect of gridlock on the form of legislation and explaining how
gridlock leads to incomplete legislation).
80 Paul Goldstein notes that although Congress was actively considering the issue of noncommercial home video taping in the wake of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Universal Studios
v. Sony, lobbying and negotiations slowed once the Supreme Court agreed to hear Sony's
appeal. Apparently, "being realists, [industry representatives] understood that a chance to do
nothing and blame it on another branch of government would be hard for Congress to resist."
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 121 (2003) (quoting an unnamed "close observer").
81 Cf Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 742-68 (2012)
(discussing the "soft power" tools at Congress's disposal in the context of inter-branch
disputes).
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Courts

Federal courts often face copyright policy decisions in the presence
of ambiguity in the Copyright Act. This of course requires one party to a
particular content-technology dispute to have filed suit. Peter Menell
has described the relationship between Congress and the courts in
making copyright law as a "symbiotic process."82 In the early period of
American history, many copyright doctrines, such as fair use and the
idea-expression distinction, were created through the common law
process and later partially codified.83 The legislative history of the
Copyright Act of 1976 shows that Congress expected judge-made law to
persist even after the legislation.84 Subsequently, litigation actually
spurred the copyright legislation of the 1990s, for example, with the
influence of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc.s8 on the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998.86 Thus, one of the ways that Congress gathers information
to set legislative priorities and draft statutes is by looking to the courts.
At the same time, one of the ways that Congress deals with a lack of
information at a particular time is by leaving issues for the courts to
resolve.
Legal scholars have long been aware that private litigation can serve
a public law function, representing the creation of regulatory policy for
third parties well beyond the litigants.87 As a method of collecting
information for the sake of making policy, litigation has both
advantages and drawbacks. The discovery process tends to reveal
informative items like the internal business-strategy communications of
technologists. Expert witnesses battle over issues like the econometric
evidence about harm to the copyright owners' sales. On the other hand,
the information courts obtain during litigation is of course limited by
the parties before it and by the parameters of what those parties choose
to pursue.88 Moreover, despite the potential value of econometric
82 Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and
Ramificationsfor Statutory Interpretation,in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed. 2012) (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 26), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1895784.
83 Id. at 4-8. See generally Matthew Sag, The Pre-History of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
1371 (2011).
84 Menell, supra note 82, at 16 & n.83 (demonstrating that Congress wrote the Copyright
Act of 1976 in general terms and expected courts to fill in the details).
85 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
86 Menell, supra note 82, at 23 (describing the DMCA safe harbors as "modeled upon the
Netcom decision").
87 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
88 See Rai, supra note 50, at 1123 ("[T]he only views that courts will generally hear are from
the litigating parties."). One possibility is that amicus briefs will make up for this deficiency. See
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information, courts may not be the best institution to evaluate it, as
compared to expert agencies that employ professional economists and
statisticians.89
One way to address the representativeness problem of litigation is
to utilize the class action mechanism.90 This particular use of the courts
to make copyright policy came to the forefront with the Google Book
Search controversy. After the parties proposed a settlement, scholars
recognized that the trial court had an opportunity to make copyright
policy where Congress had failed to do so. 91 As we argue below in Part
III, the ultimate decision to reject the parties' proposed settlement was
an expression of the insufficiency of the information available to the
court.
The Google Book Search litigation also highlights another function
of courts: their potential to serve a supervisory or monitoring role in the
context of consent decrees. In this role, courts may promote private
bargaining or generate tolerable rate-setting solutions (that are
preferable to antitrust actions against the copyright owners).92 Courts
supervising consent decrees also have the potential to develop expertise
and collect a great deal of information over time. This can serve an
important complementary role to other institutions in resolving
content-technology disputes.
3.

Copyright Office

The Copyright Office is an administrative agency subordinate to
the Librarian of Congress. Until after World War II, the Copyright
Office was a relatively weak administrative agency with limited
authority.93 In more recent decades, it has come to play an important
role in copyright policymaking in general and in resolving contenttechnology disputes in particular. Joseph Liu describes this trend as
follows:
More generally, the role of the Librarian of Congress (and the
Copyright Office within the Library of Congress) under this

Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts' Friends Can Teach Us About the
Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 398 (2011).
89 See Rai, supra note 50, at 1123 ("[T]he court system does not have the resources to
evaluate fully complicated questions of economic policy."). But note that the Copyright Office
does not actually employ any economists in substantive policy roles.
90 See Chayes, supra note 87, at 1311-12.
91 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS.
L. REV. 479, 515-16.
92 See Crane,supra note 54, at 308-09.
93 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 94 (2004) ("The Copyright
Office's role was primarily ministerial and involved little or no substantive policymaking.").
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approach is far greater. The new role not only encompasses
recordkeeping, but also involves serving as an expert advisor to
Congress on copyright matters (for example, providing technical
advice and reports, and reviewing and drafting proposed legislation),
rate setting and distribution of funds for certain compulsory licenses,
and in some cases even substantive rulemaking.94
As an expert agency, the Copyright Office has the capacity to engage in
substantive rulemaking.95 The Copyright Office also intervenes in
litigation, offering its substantive interpretation of the law and even
urging the DOJ to take certain positions in recent constitutional
litigation relating to copyright.96 It can also offer perspective on broader
policy initiatives, such as reform of licensing in the music industry.97
Finally, the Copyright Office has expertise in the area of statutory ratesetting.98

From an informational perspective, the Copyright Office can take
advantage of rulemaking proceedings to solicit a great deal of
information from a variety of interested parties. As experts in copyright
law, the Copyright Office staff may ask better questions and assimilate
the data more effectively than either politicians or district court judges
when faced with a content-technology dispute.99 The information
might be assembled and analyzed with more transparency and integrity
than with other governmental institutions, because the Copyright Office
operates under the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act,
which entails procedural safeguards such as abuse-of-discretion review
by appellate courts. 0 0 But agency rulemaking has its informational

94 Id. at 104 (footnotes omitted).

95 See Arielle Singh, Agency Regulation in Copyright Law: Rulemaking Under the DMCA
and Its Broader Implications, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 527 (2011).
96 The Copyright Office played this role, for example, in Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873
(2012), and CapitalRecords, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Minn. 2011).
97 Copyright Office Views on Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 16
(2005) (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office); see
also Brian Sanchez, The Section 115 Mechanical License and the Copyright Modernization Act:
The Hardshipsof Legislating Music Industry Negotiations, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. &
POL'Y 37, 75-76 (2006).
98 See, e.g., Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292, 77,294-95 (Dec.
11, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201) (describing the Copyright Office's expertise with
statutory licensing).
99 Cf Michael Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1747, 1787 (2011)
(stating, in the context of advocating a regulatory approach to patent law, that "related to the
problem of information gathering is the challenge of bringing the right expertise to analyze and
understand that information" and concluding that agencies fare better than courts on this
score); Eric Schwartz, The Role of the Copyright Office in the Age of Information, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69, 78 (1994) (asserting the Copyright Office's expertise on questions of
copyrightability).
100 Cf Benjamin & Rai, supra note 48, at 303-04 (describing how the standards of the
Administrative Procedure Act apply to policymaking by the Patent and Trademark Office).
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drawbacks, too. Scholars of administrative law have criticized agency
rulemaking as inefficient and ineffective.'o' All forms of capture are of
concern with agencies. But a particular concern, given our informationfocused perspective, is the problem of informational capture: agencies
often limit themselves to the data and the perspective of the entities they
regulate. 102 In the specific context of the Copyright Office, scholars have
noted that the agency faces limits in its fact-finding abilities.103 Finally,
there have been flaws in the arbitration panels that the Copyright Office
has supervised in rate-setting proceedings. We discuss the problems
with webcasting regulation in detail in Section II.D below.
4.

Federal Communications Commission

As the primary telecommunications regulator, the FCC is bound to
make decisions that affect copyright policy, because of the inextricable
links between communications media and the copyrighted works
distributed over those media. 104 One classic example of the intersection
between copyright law and communications law comes from cable
regulation. Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, television
broadcasters used FCC regulation as a way to obtain copyright-like
rights in their broadcast signals-and ultimately slow down the
development of cable.105 A more recent example demonstrates that the
FCC's authority over copyright policy is limited. With its proposed
broadcast flag regulation, the FCC attempted unsuccessfully to force
technologists (television manufacturers) to participate in a copyright
enforcement scheme.106 The positive and negative attributes of agency
rulemaking discussed in the previous subsection with respect to the
Copyright Office also apply to the FCC. Although the FCC has more

101 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REv. 1, 3 (1997) ("Regulation is currently under attack from all quarters as inefficient,
ineffective, and undemocratic. That the rule-making process is ossified, that implementation is
inconsistent, and that enforcement is at best sporadic are by now uncontroversial claims.").
102 See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 834 (2003) (explaining the informational capture thesis).
103 See Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving Standards and the Future of DMCA Rulemaking, 10 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 21 (2007) ("The Copyright Office, of course, possesses neither the institutional
competence nor the authority to determine on its own, in a non-judicial proceeding, which uses
are noninfringing.").
104 See Weiser, supra note 51, at 12 ("[Tlhe federal courts are unlikely to be the sole
battleground for the future of copyright policy. In particular, there are a number of
developments that suggest that the FCC and other actors will play an important role in
regulating content in the digital age.").
105 See Wu, supra note 1, at 315-19.
106 See Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 703-05 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
FCC did not have jurisdiction over broadcast transmissions once they reached consumers' settop boxes).
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power than the Copyright Office within its sphere of jurisdiction, it still
suffers from the drawbacks of agency rulemaking and from a poor track
record justifying its actions in appellate litigation. Nonetheless, the FCC
is an important government institution involved in copyright policy.
5.

Antitrust Agencies

The Department of Justice plays three key roles in copyright law.
The first is copyright enforcement, through criminal investigations and
prosecutions.107 The second is defending constitutional challenges to
copyright statutes. 08 The third is antitrust enforcement. The Antitrust
Division of the DOJ has pursued important prosecutions related to
copyright law over the decades, from ASCAPo9

to Microsoft.11o

Antitrust investigations offer the power of an agency with economic and
econometric expertise collecting relevant information about market
conditions. Moreover, antitrust can serve as a way to police private
arrangements.' From an information-focused perspective, these are
important benefits. On the other hand, antitrust enforcement can be
slow and overly reactive, retrospective rather than prospective.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can also play a role in
copyright law, particularly to the extent that copyright law and
consumer protection concerns overlap.112 In general, the DOJ and FTC
have not been a major source of copyright policy, but some
commentators have seen potential in both antitrust agencies' capacity
for monitoring competition.113

107 Four additional agencies also have some responsibility for copyright enforcement: the
Copyright Office, the U.S. Customs Service, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the
Department of Commerce. Trudy S. Martin, Vicarious and Contributory Liability for Internet
Host Providers:Combating Copyright Infringement in the United States, Russia, and China, 27
WIS. INT'L L.J. 363, 383 (2007). In some content-technology disputes, government enforcement
could play a role, but we will not focus on that possibility in this Article.
10 Marybeth Peters, Constitutional Challenges to Copyright Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
509, 509 (2007) (mentioning the DOJ's role in defending constitutional challenges, and the
Copyright Office's cooperation).
109 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 1940-1943 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 5 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
110 Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249, 301-04 (2003) (describing the Microsoft
case as an example of DOJ antitrust enforcement against a copyright owner).
111 Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation 14-15 (Feb. 1, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2008953.
112 See, e.g., Michelle R. Hull, Sports Leagues' New Social Media Policies: Enforcement Under
Copyright Law and State Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 457, 488 n. 210 (2011) (discussing an
FTC decision on copyright warnings).
113 See Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale & Kim Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust
Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 519
(2002).
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Other Executive Branch Institutions

Finally, we must mention the possibility of other executive branch
institutions becoming involved in copyright policy. Starting with
President Theodore Roosevelt's criticisms of the composer trusts, the
President can use either his bully pulpit or more behind-the-scenes
methods to influence copyright policy. One prominent example
involved the Clinton White House, the Department of Commerce, and
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), led by Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and PTO chief Bruce Lehman, crafting copyright
enforcement policy in the 1990s.114 Another more recent example is the

effort of President Obama's "copyright czar," Victoria Espinel, and her
office, in securing voluntary agreements between credit card companies
and copyright owners and between online advertising companies and
copyright owners.1 15 These efforts were aimed at enlisting additional
participants in the struggle to secure greater copyright enforcement
online. At the same time, the United States Trade Representative has
been negotiating the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA).116 These alternative institutions for copyright
policy within the executive branch have the potential benefit of
flexibility in how they gather information and convene private parties to
negotiations. But the interventions by these institutions have often
suffered from a lack of transparency.
In this survey of the government institutions involved in copyright
policy, we have focused on the capacity of each institution to generate,
gather and make use of policy relevant information. In Part II of the
Article, we turn to the case studies that illustrate the ways in which these
institutions operate in combination and the effect of different
institutions' timing as they become involved in content-technology
disputes.
II. CASE STUDIES
In this Part we apply our theoretical framework to four case studies
of content-technology disputes: publishers and composers versus piano
roll manufacturers; ASCAP (the performing rights organization for
See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 89-96.
See Peter S. Menell, Design for Symbiosis: Promoting More Harmonious Paths for
Technological Innovators and Expressive Creators in the Internet Age 4 (Jan. 31, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1995598.
116 Michael Geist, ACTA's State of Play: Looking Beyond Transparency, 26 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 543, 544 (2011) (noting the problem of transparency before discussing other critiques of
the agreement).
114
115
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publishers and composers) versus radio broadcasters; motion picture
studios versus VCR manufacturers; and record labels versus webcasters.
Section D, which is on webcasting, is especially detailed. Unlike the
other controversies, the long-running dispute between record labels and
webcasters has not previously been the subject of a comprehensive, upto-date study of the many instances of government intervention. Each
case study demonstrates the explanatory and normative usefulness of
the information-focused perspective on copyright policy we advocate.
A.

Publishersand PianoRoll Manufacturers

The dispute between publishers (along with the composers and
songwriters whose copyrights they owned or administered) and piano
roll manufacturers can be thought of as the first modern contenttechnology dispute.
1. A Timeline of the Publisher-Piano Roll Dispute
In 1895, several powerful publishers organized under the umbrella
of the Music Publishers Association117 Various threats to their main
revenue source, sales of sheet music, had emerged-particularly the
player piano and the phonograph.118 The Music Publishers Association
provided a vehicle for the publishers and composers' efforts at lobbying
for legislative changes that would grant them control over the so-called
"mechanical" reproductions of musical works that player pianos and
phonographs were capable of making. Congress and the Register of
Copyrights began discussing a copyright reform bill in 1901 to clean up
various problems and inconsistencies in the statute. 119
Meanwhile, starting in 1902, certain publishers and one of the
player piano companies, Aeolian, agreed to exclusive licensing deals.120
Under the terms of these agreements, Aeolian would have the sole right
to produce piano rolls featuring recorded performances of the licensor
n7 see SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 22. This body still exists today. See MuSic
PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.mpa.org (last visited Sept. 9,
2012).
118 See Alex S. Cummings, From Monopoly to Intellectual Property: Music Piracy and the
Remaking of American Copyright, 1909-1971,97 J. AM. HIST. 659,662-63 (2010).

119 See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 38.
120 While many scholars have noted the existence of these licenses to Aeolian, only one
source marks the date of the first license to Aeolian at 1902. Richard J.Spelts, Comment, Battle
over the Compulsory License: Mechanical Recording of Music, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 503-04
(1964). Other sources imply that the date of the licenses might have been later. See, e.g., Theresa
M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Goodbye to Madonna's American Pie: Why Mechanical
Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 290 (2001).
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publishers' musical works. Eighty-seven publishers, representing
hundreds of thousands of musical works, licensed Aeolian. The
combination of the leading player piano company and dozens of
publishers' catalogs eventually led Congress and the President to have
antitrust concerns.121 Whether Aeolian and the music publishers had in
fact achieved a position of market dominance is unclear. 122 Aeolian was
the exclusive licensee of a vast musical catalog, but, on the other hand,
another 117 publishers, representing an even larger number of musical
works, chose not to license Aeolian.123
As the issue of mechanical rights lingered, the Librarian of
Congress finally convened a conference in 1905, inviting copyright
owners, librarians, and unions, but leaving out the technologists.124
President Theodore Roosevelt also became involved, giving a 1905
speech in favor of sweeping copyright reform.125 Negotiations in
Congress stalled in 1906 and 1907; different versions of the legislation
emerged, but no bill was passed at that time.126 President Roosevelt
made more specific comments targeted at the publishers and Aeolian in
1907, referring to a "giant music monopoly" in a public statement.127
Meanwhile, the publishers and Aeolian decided to pursue a
strategy of litigation against the unlicensed piano roll manufacturers.
Aeolian financed the lawsuit against its competitor Apollo, apparently
as a condition of its exclusive licenses.128 The federal trial court ruled
against the publishers in 1905.129 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision almost exactly a year later in
1906.130 Recall that negotiations over new copyright legislation were in
the process of stalling at that point in the timeline; in 1907, a member of
the House of Representatives suggested that Congress wait for the
Supreme Court's decision.131

121 See Howard B. Abrams, Copyright's First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 220 (2010) (reporting the number of licensed publishers and

the number of works controlled).
122 Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraints and Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1908 & n.221 (2003).
123 See Abrams, supra note 121 (reporting the analogous numbers for unlicensed
publishers).
124 See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 39.
125 Randy S. Kravis, Comment, Does a Song by Any Other Name Still Sound As Sweet?:
Digital Sampling and Its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 272 n.252 (1993).

126 See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 39-40.
127 SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 22.

128 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 51-53 (2003); Abrams, supra note 121, at 219.
129 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 139 F. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1905), affd 147 F. 226
(2d Cir. 1906), affd, 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
130 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 147 F. 226 (2d Cir. 1906).
131 H.R. REP. No. 25133 (1907).
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On February 24, 1908, the Supreme Court decided White-Smith
Music PublishingCo. v. Apollo Co.,132 which held-affirming the lower
courts' decisions on the issue-that piano rolls did not infringe the
composers' copyrights. The opinion relied on a formal distinction,
consistent with the decisions of previous courts, between sheet music
and mechanical reproductions. Contrasts between sheet music, visible
"to the eye" so that a human can play compositions, and piano rolls,
"part of a machine" that plays music, appear throughout the opinion.133
But the Court also emphasized the statutory nature of copyright, as
opposed to a right based in common law or natural law.134 But Justice
Day's majority opinion emphasized that Congress must amend the
Copyright Act for piano rolls to infringe composers' copyrights.135
Justice Holmes, in a concurring opinion, advocated that Congress do
just that. 136
The committees responsible for intellectual property in both the
House and the Senate jointly held hearings in March 1908, very soon
after the Supreme Court's ruling. In the process, Congress encouraged
the publishers and piano roll companies to negotiate a solution, finally
including the technologists in the discussion.137 Private deliberations
continued for another year. Finally, on March 4, 1909, President
Roosevelt signed the Copyright Act of 1909 into law.138 Section 1(e) of
the Act included a compromise between the publishers and the piano
roll companies. Piano rolls were now to be infringing copies of
compositions. 139 But the piano roll companies would get the benefit of a
compulsory license. They could manufacture piano rolls of
compositions without prior permission, and had only the obligation to
pay $0.02 per copy.140
132
133

White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
Id. at 12-14, 17 (references to "the eye"); id. at 12-14, 18 (references to a "machine" or

"mechanism").
134 Id. at 15 ("In the last analysis this case turns upon the construction of a statute, for it is
perfectly well settled that the protection given to copyrights in this country is wholly
statutory."); see also id. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring) ("[Copyright] is a right which could not
be recognized or endured for more than a limited time and therefore, I may remark, in passing,
it is one which hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute, as the authorities now
agree.").
135 Id. at 18.
136 Id. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring) ("On principle anything that mechanically reproduces
that collocation of sounds ought to be held a copy, or, if the statute is too narrow, ought to be
made so by a further act, except so far as some extraneous consideration of policy may
oppose.").
137
138

LITMAN, supra note 1, at 40.
Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (amended 1976).

139 Id. § 1(e) (establishing a right "to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody
of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be
recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced").
140 Id. That same compulsory license exists today, more or less, with a different price and a
procedure to update the price. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006).
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The Compulsory Licensing Legacy of Piano Rolls

Why did the Supreme Court decide White-Smith in the way that it
did? One view is that the Court actually believed in a formal distinction
between sheet music and piano rolls as different technologies. Another
suggestion is that the Court harbored antitrust concerns about Aeolian,
which were left unstated in the opinion but animated the result.141 We
would also emphasize the Court's deference to Congress and its
recognition of the importance and difficulty of the issue. 14 2 From an
informational perspective, taking all three of these rationales together
makes the decision seem quite logical. This was truly a new legal issue,
with the future path of the recording industry still uncertain. A decision
for the publishers might have foreclosed further negotiation with piano
roll companies other than Aeolian, given the background worry about
monopoly. A decision for the piano roll manufacturer, however, seems
more likely to have spurred continued negotiations. Victory improved
the bargaining position of the technologists in this dispute, but the
Court's opinion and Justice Holmes's concurrence sent a strong signal
that it expected Congress to weigh in.143 And as it happened, Congress
had four different solutions still pending at the negotiating table. 144
So what were Congress's policy goals in 1909, and why did it
choose the property rights allocation that it did? One explanation is that
Congress was concerned mainly about the threat of monopoly presented
by the publishers trying to license only to Aeolian.145 Another
explanation would be that Congress found compulsory licensing
appealing on its own merits. But it does not appear, at least in any
source we reviewed, that Congress understood that the compulsory
license would allow for "cover versions" of compositions to be made
141 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622-23 (2001) ("The Court may have suspected that the music
publishers were endeavoring either to prevent the distribution of a new format that competed
with sheet music, or, equally perniciously, to control the market for phonogram recording
equipment and phonograph players."); see also Wu, supra note 1, at 302 ("One cannot help
noticing that the effect of the decision was to place a limit on the market power of the effective
owner of the 'intellectual conception,' namely, the incumbent industry.").
142 White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908) (describing the issue as
having "considerable importance").
143 Cf Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations To Override: CongressionalReversals
of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996).
144 LITMAN, supra note 1, at 39-40.
145 Section 115 Compulsory License: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (Mar. 11, 2004)
available at
Register of Copyrights),
(statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters,
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/92480.PDF ("Congress, however, was concerned that the right
to make mechanical reproductions of musical works might become a monopoly controlled by a
single company. Therefore, it decided that rather than provide for an exclusive right to make
mechanical reproductions, it would create a compulsory license. . . .").
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freely once a song had been recorded once. Although the compulsory
license has been a boon to many musicians' creativity,146 that was not
Congress's goal in 1909. A better explanation is that Congress simply
sought to reach a compromise between two competing interests that it
saw as legitimate: the publishers' and composers' interest in
compensation and the piano roll manufacturers' interest in growing and
profiting from the nascent recording industry.147 But it is crucial to
recognize that the solution did not come from Congress; it came from
private negotiations that Congress encouraged and monitored.148 This
was a vigorous dispute between copyright owners and technologists.
Congress was eager for the dispute to be resolved and for the parties to
negotiate a solution between themselves, perhaps with some supervision
and prodding from legislators.
We do not mean to take an overly optimistic view of the resolution
of the publisher-piano roll dispute. Procedurally, Congress's method of
legislating by inviting (and later pushing) parties to bargain developed
an unfortunate tendency. In ensuing decades, Congress continued to
allow copyright owners to negotiate over legislation privately without
the presence of all interested parties, such as new technologists or the
general public, repeating the mistake it made in 1905 and 1906 by
leaving out the piano roll manufacturers.149 Intervention in contenttechnology disputes by Congress cannot catalyze private negotiations if
Congress is willing to let one side craft the legislation without input
from other stakeholders. A sensible, information-focused approach to
copyright policy requires that the government institutions seek to
acquire reliable information from and about all relevant parties to
content-technology disputes.
Other commentators have criticized Congress's substantive
approach to property rights allocation in the piano rolls conflict. On this
view, Congress erred by imposing a compulsory license,150 setting the
price arbitrarily,s1 and failing to build in adjustment for inflation.152

These critiques have some force. But they underemphasize the fact that
the publishers agreed to the compulsory license. And they ignore the
useful role of government in resolving the licensing dispute and
146See, e.g., McLEOD &DICOLA, supra note 29, at 225-28.
147 See Ginsburg, supra note 141, at 1626-27 (describing Congress's motivation as a

compromise). Apparently the Senate favored the copyright owners' perspective, but the House
also saw value in the development of a recording industry. Id.
148 See LITMAN, supra note 1, at 40.
149 Id. at 46-48.
150 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 28, at 1299.
151 See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 659,

699-700 (1999).
152 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("The inadequacy of the two-cent rate after half a century of economic change had long
been recognized.").
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avoiding monopolization. The compromise has lasted, with some
alterations, for over a century. This makes the length of the dispute seem
shorter in retrospect, even though it dragged on longer than necessary.
Congress and the courts, operating independently, made choices that
eventually pushed the relevant parties to the bargaining table. The
Supreme Court's approach set Congress up to encourage and monitor
more fruitful private negotiations. Each institution refrained from
outlawing the new technology and gathered information as the social
value of the recording industry became more and more apparent with
each passing year.153 Congress and the courts acted when knowing
enough about the new technology's value, and promoted a compromise
that is less than perfect but has allowed both publishers and the
recording industry to profit for over 100 years.
B.

ASCAP and Radio Broadcasters

The 1909 Copyright Act included a provision that extended the
relatively new public performance right to non-dramatic musical
works.154 By 1913, prominent composers and songwriters had begun
talking about organizing in order to collect royalties based on this new
right.155 The composers maintained their concern about new media
cutting into sales of sheet music. 156 In 1914, the American Society of
Composers, Arrangers, and Publishers officially incorporated.157 Thus,
the story of the content-technology dispute between composers and
radio stations began with Congress expanding the composers' property
rights, and was followed soon after by the composers creating a private
organization that would specialize in collecting upon that right.
1.

Precursors to the ASCAP-Radio Dispute

Over the next few years, ASCAP used the judicial system to
establish the meaning and extent of the public performance right. The
earliest cases concerned hotels, restaurants, and cabarets. 158 The
See SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 23 (describing the growth in phonograph sales).
The 1897 copyright statute referred to a performance right in "any dramatic or musical
composition." Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82; see also White-Smith
Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 16 (1908) (discussing the statute). But the only three
153
154

actions brought under the "musical" prong dealt with use in professional theater. SANJEK &
SANJEK, supra note 1, at 37.
155 SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 38.
156 See JOHN RYAN, THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: THE ASCAP-

BMI CONTROVERSY 15-16 (1985).
157 SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 38.
158 Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (holding performances of musical works in
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subsequent battle was even larger, against the movie industry. The initial
concern of the composers was to collect on the music played live to
accompany silent films. But the concern would eventually shift from the
theater owners to the movie studios, once films began to incorporate
sound. Litigation between the composers and the movie industry came
out in ASCAP's favor.59
In 1922, the FTC opened the first antitrust investigation into
ASCAP's activities. The investigation was resolved that year, with no
charges brought against ASCAP.160 Soon after, the DOJ conducted an
investigation that lasted from 1924 to 1926, but with the same result.161
But the file was only closed with respect to the charges related to
licensing "places of amusement"; the charges related to radio were left
unresolved, and thus, the DOJ kept its file open.16 2 These early antitrust
investigations show that three government institutions had already been
deeply involved in ASCAP's early development: Congress, the courts,
and the antitrust agencies. So throughout the looming dispute with
radio, all parties would have been aware of the availability of these
policy tools. ASCAP has existed under the shadow of the threat of
antitrust investigation and enforcement for almost all of its existence.
2.

The ASCAP-Radio Dispute and Antitrust Scrutiny

The opening salvo in the battle with radio came in 1922, during the
same year that the motion picture industry sought action by the FTC.
Thus, ASCAP found itself fighting active battles on two crucial fronts
(movies and radio) just after settling things with the hotel, restaurant,
and cabaret owners. The initial demand from ASCAP to the radio
stations was phrased in terms of lost revenue. ASCAP's position was
that radio owed them annual fees approximately equal to the difference
between yearly sheet music sales before radio and yearly sheet music
sales after radio's emergence.163 This would become a recurring theme
for copyright owners in content-technology disputes that is still used in
hotels or restaurants are public performances for profit even if money is not charged at the
door); John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 241 U.S. 655 (1916) (granting certiorari in a case
later decided in the same opinion as Herbert v. Shanley).
159 See Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922) (holding motion picture exhibitors'
defense that ASCAP violated the Sherman Act must fail).
160 See SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 50, 81 (describing FTC as giving ASCAP a "clean
bill of health"); see also RYAN, supra note 156, at 33.
161 See SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 81; RYAN, supra note 156, at 33.
162 RYAN, supra note 156, at 93 (stating that this fact about the investigation remaining
technically open is "generally not known").
163 Id. at 32 ("ASCAP let it be known that it was seeking to obtain at least $1 million per year
from radio, the amount of income [from sheet-music sales] it felt had been lost each year
because of the effects of the new medium.").
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the present day. When the radio stations resisted, ASCAP launched a
series of lawsuits analogous to the earlier lawsuits against the hotels,
restaurants, and cabarets. From 1923 to 1931, ASCAP enjoyed three
victories in court.164 The last of these established that multiple radio
stations broadcasting the same performance committed multiple
infringements. 165
As ASCAP pursued its litigation strategy in the courts, the radio
stations lobbied Congress for changes to the Copyright Act. The radio
stations organized for these efforts by forming the National Association
of Broadcasters (NAB) in 1923.166 The NAB was-and is-a trade
association that includes two factions whose interests sometimes
coincide and sometimes clash: the networks (including their owned and
operated stations) and the independent stations (which might or might
not carry network programming).167 In Congress during the mid-1920s,
the NAB first pursued a complete exemption from the public
performance right. As a second-best outcome, the NAB sought a
compulsory license akin to the mechanical license of the 1909 Act that
the phonograph companies enjoyed. 168
By 1932, the vast majority of radio stations in the U.S. had acquired
ASCAP licenses.169 But that was merely a d6tente in a longer war. The
1932 license included a change that was disadvantageous to many radio
stations. Prior to 1932, the ASCAP license required each radio station to
pay a flat fee based on the percentage of broadcast time spent playing
music. But in 1932 ASCAP instituted blanket licensing. At that point,
radio stations still had to pay an annual "sustaining fee." On top of that,
each station would pay a percentage of its revenue in return for a
blanket license to publicly perform all ASCAP-administered
compositions-regardless of the percentage of music played that came
from ASCAP. 170 A more subtle but also crucial aspect of the license was
the fact that ASCAP demanded information from radio stations about
what music the stations played, but supplied no information in return
about the exact contents of its catalog. This aspect of the business
arrangement between ASCAP and radio kept ASCAP publishers,
164 Buck v. Jewell-Lasalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am.
Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925); M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co.,
291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923).
165 Buck, 283 U.S. at 197-98.
166 SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 50.

167 See RYAN, supra note 156, at 85-87 (describing differing interests of networks and
independents in deciding whether to accept an ASCAP licensing proposal).
168 Senator Dill's draft bill in 1926 included an odd provision-its compulsory licensing
scheme would have been entirely prospective. Retrospectively, the radio stations would have
owed zero royalties for previous years. The bill did not pass. Id. at 35.
169 SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 161 (describing the three year contract between
ASCAP and radio achieved in 1932).
170 RYAN, supra note 156, at 37.
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composers, and songwriters apprised of market trends and use of nonASCAP competitors' music. Meanwhile, both radio stations and the
antitrust agencies remained in the dark about exactly what compositions
ASCAP owned.171

In 1934 the DOJ reopened its investigation into ASCAP and filed a
formal complaint. 172 (Recall that the DOJ's file had technically been kept
open since 1926.) Areas of anticompetitive concern included: the flat
fee, the behavior of ASCAP agents, collusion with the publishers to raise
mechanical royalties well above the statutory rate, restricted access to
radio, and higher prices to local advertisers.173 The investigation went
some distance inquiring into ASCAP's business practices. But with a
new license between ASCAP and radio signed in 1935, the investigation
did not result in charges and went inactive officially in 1936. Another
key reason the investigation fizzled was the departure of Warner Bros.
from ASCAP in 1935 and its subsequent return a few months later.174
During the period in 1935 and 1936 that Warner was not part of
ASCAP, it was untenable to claim that ASCAP had a monopoly, due to
the size and economic importance of the Warner catalog.175
When the antitrust investigation stalled, the broadcasters took an
ultimately fruitless turn toward using state law. On a parallel track, in
October 1939, the radio broadcasters formed their own performing
rights organization with non-ASCAP composers and songwriters:
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).176 This came in response to delaying
tactics on the part of ASCAP as both sides prepared for negotiations in
anticipation of the expiration of the 1935 contract. Many composers and
songwriters in particular genres-country music, and rhythm and
blues-had been disadvantaged within ASCAP, had their membership
delayed by years, or simply found themselves left out of ASCAP. 177 So
there were plenty of musical works to fill a rival catalog. The new
organization had predecessors in its attempt to offer competition to
ASCAP.178 But BMI was the first competitor to thrive-and it has
survived to this day. Negotiations between ASCAP and radio came close
to breaking down in early 1940.179 With BMI in place, the radio
broadcasters gradually reduced their dependence on ASCAP music
Id. at 38 (explaining ASCAP's informational advantage).
Id. at 94.
173 See id. at 50-52 (summarizing the areas of antitrust concern).
174 SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 153-54.
175 RYAN, supra note 156, at 94.
176 See generally SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 175-83 (describing, in the definitive
history of BMI by the organization's official historians, the first two years of BMI's existence).
177 See RYAN, supra note 156, at 65-71 (discussing issues about ASCAP's membership
practices).
178 See id. at 23 (describing a rival society started by the motion picture theatre companies in
1922).
179 Id. at 87.
171

172

HeinOnline -- 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 206 2012

2012]

INFORMATION-GATHERING APPROACH

207

starting as early as April of 1940.180 The broadcast networks NBC and
CBS began instituting quotas of non-ASCAP music for certain
programs.181
In May of 1940, the DOJ reopened its investigation once again.
This time around, subpoenas produced a wealth of information that
ASCAP had previously kept from radio stations and the DOJ: names of
licensees, names of members, and even names of applicants. On
December 26, 1940 the DOJ announced criminal proceedings against
ASCAP-and the radio broadcasters and BMI as well. 182 This increase in
pressure led BMI to sign a consent decree on January 28, 1941.183
ASCAP signed a similar consent decree just a month later on February
26, 1941.184 The broadcasters had complained that suing them and BMI
had made agreements less likely,185 but within two months the DOJ had
applied enough pressure to avoid trial and achieve settlement with both
performing rights organizations.
The consent decree had less favorable terms for ASCAP than it had
enjoyed previously. It gave ASCAP a lower percentage of radio stations'
revenue as a licensing fee. It restricted ASCAP to non-exclusive licenses
from its members (among other reforms internal to the organization).
And it required ASCAP to offer licensees the option of "per piece"
licensing in addition to the blanket license. Independent broadcasters
won an important concession, achieving a switch to "payment at the
source," in which the network originating a program had to pay
ASCAP, not the affiliates. 186 Perhaps the worst aspect of the outcome for
ASCAP was the birth of a viable competitor in BMI. Over the decades,
both performing rights organizations' consent decrees have been
modified-most importantly, eliminating the "per piece" option in the
1950 amended decree. But both consent decrees remain in place,
supervised by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. 187

180 Id.

181 Id. at 87-88.
182 SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 1, at 182.
183 RYAN, supra note 156, at 96-97.
184 Id. at 98.
185 Id. at 96 ("Outraged, the networks accused the Justice Department of eliminating any
possibility of a truce with ASCAP . . .
186 Id. at 97-99.
187 See Crane, supra note 54; Jonah A. Knobler, Performance Anxiety: The Internet and
Copyright's Vanishing Performance/DistributionDistinction, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 531,
545 (2007) (describing the operation of the "ASCAP Rate Court" in the Southern District of
New York).
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Assessing the Government's Role in Private, Collective Licenses

Sociologist John Ryan has described ASCAP at its birth as "a
private organization for the enforcement of a public law."188 As ASCAP
developed-and as it waged battle with the radio broadcasters from
1922 until 1941-several government institutions played a role in
shaping it. Congress made ASCAP possible by extending the public
performance right to musical works in the first place and continued to
exert some pressure on the organization through hearings. Court rulings
defining the scope of the public performance right gave ASCAP leverage
over radio and prevented the state legislatures from getting involved.
And the antitrust agencies, in particular the DOJ, repeatedly put
pressure on ASCAP to reach licensing deals with the radio broadcasters.
As Ryan puts it, ASCAP was "constantly faced with the possibility that a
decision will be reversed, that the law will somehow be reinterpreted, or
that it will lose the support of the enforcing agency."89 Through this
process ASCAP's centralizing efficiency was maintained, but its
potential monopoly power was curbed.
Government institutions provided the cauldron in which private
licensing deals between ASCAP and radio took place and the fire that
made sure those deals got done. Congress and the courts vindicated the
interests of composers in receiving compensation for their work, forcing
the radio networks and stations to negotiate. But the DOJ kept applying
the heat, opening and re-opening antitrust investigations that forced
ASCAP to offer more reasonable terms to the broadcasters. Contrary to
the customary modern portrayal of ASCAP and BMI as private
solutions to a transaction-cost or negotiating problem,190 the historical
record clearly reveals that ASCAP and BMI have always been the hybrid
products of both public and private ordering. With the courts
continuing to exercise a supervisory role for over seven decades, we
think this assertion is undeniable and important. Court supervision
prevents ASCAP or BMI not just from gouging users with unreasonable
rates, but also from withholding too much information from policy
makers. It is with the aid of government institutions that ASCAP and
BMI have thrived to become the exemplary licensing solution they are.
To be sure, these organizations have their flaws, but achieving the result
of two large performing rights organizations (and a third, smaller

188 RYAN, supra note 156, at 17.
189 Id. at 124.

190 Merges, supra note 28, at 1299 ("This Article studies a number of privately established
organizations in the intellectual property field that have operated successfully without statutory
compulsory licensing. Patent pools and collective copyright licensing organizations such as
ASCAP and BMI collect rights from diverse sources and price them for sale to users."
(emphasis added)).
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competitor in SESAC) was not a bad outcome of the DOJ's efforts back
in the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s.
Throughout this important, two-decade episode in the music
industry's history, obtaining information was crucial. At the beginning
of this content-technology dispute, policy makers did not have good
information about the nature of radio as a medium; commercial
advertising had not yet arrived for radio as of 1922. Without
information about radio's revenue model, and without more years of
information on composers' sales of sheet music, policy makers could
not have known what sort of deal to push the parties towards. In 1932
and 1935, ASCAP and radio managed to reach their own deals privately,
with the specter of new legislation or antitrust enforcement lurking in
the background. At that time, policy makers knew that radio was here to
stay, that it made money commercially, and that the composers would
earn less revenue without radio-licensing fees. But the policy makers did
not know that negotiations were impossible. Only in 1939 and 1940,
with the birth of BMI and the ensuing boycott of ASCAP, did it appear
that the parties had reached an impasse. At that point, with the help of
subpoenas, the DOJ acquired the information it needed to push the
parties to a negotiated solution. In sum, the government institutions
involved in the ASCAP-radio dispute appear to have played an
imperfect, somewhat messy, consistent, and ultimately beneficial role in
ensuring that radio listeners would have access to all musical works and
that composers and songwriters would receive compensation.
C.

Movie Studios and VCR Manufacturers

The introduction of the VCR as a mass-market consumer item in
the mid- 1970s is an important chapter in the recurring conflict between
content owners and the developers of new technology.191 The conflict
itself was straightforward: copyright owners and broadcast networks
sought to maintain control of their programming; whereas electronics
manufacturers sought to meet the consumer demand for convenience
and flexibility offered by the new technology.
Critically for our analysis, the content owners sought to test the
legality of the VCR very early in its development. The Sony Betamax
went on sale in 1975; a year later Universal City Studios, Inc. and Walt
Disney Productions filed a lawsuit alleging that Sony Corporation, the

191The first cassette home VCR was made available in the United States in 1972, however it
was not a commercial success. The Sony Betamax model home VCR was introduced in 1975.
See Brief of National Retail Merchants Ass'n, as Amicus Curiae, Supporting Appellees, Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687). The VCR is
also referred to as a Video Tape Recorder or VTR in the cases cited herein.
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manufacturer of the device, was responsible for any copyright
infringement made possible by the new machine.192 The timing of the
challenge has led to Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
acquiring significance far beyond the specific technology at issue in the
case. Sony was, in effect, the test case determining how the Court would
deal with technology/content conflicts where the development, uses,
benefits, and potential harms of a nascent technology are unknown.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sony has two distinct
components: the first examined whether consumer time-shifting of
broadcast television for later viewing was fair use or copyright
infringement; 193 the second concerned the manufacturer's liability for a
technology which had both infringing and noninfringing uses. 94
1.

The Implications of Sony for Content-Technology Disputes

The Sony decision has three implications for the content
distributor/technology-maker divide. First, Sony sets an important
precedent as to how courts should deal with emerging technology and
uncertain harms. The majority in Sony differed from the dissent by
holding that the harm attributed to a new technology must be proven
and cannot merely be assumed.195 Specifically, in relation to the fair use
doctrine, the majority held that non-commercial consumer timeshifting of free-to-air broadcast television was fair use because the
plaintiffs had offered no convincing evidence of market harm, then or in
the future. 196
The plaintiffs in Sony argued that the VCR would cause a number
of harms. Primarily they argued that the availability of pre-recorded
programs would substitute for first run television, repeats, and even
theatrical exhibition and film rental.197 Content owners also worried
that time-shifting might interfere with the measurement of television
audiences and would thus impair the networks' abilities to sell those
audiences to advertisers.198 The district court and a majority of the

192 Sony, 464 U.S. at 458.
193 See id. at 475-98 (discussing the application of the fair use doctrine in copyright law).
194 See id. at 439-56 (examining whether the Sony Betamax is capable of substantial
noninfringing uses).
195 See id. at 451 ("What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.").
196 Id. at 450-51.
197 Id. at 452-53. Film rental here does not refer to the market for home video rental, which
did not exist at the time of the district court trial in Sony.
198 Id. Less tangibly, the plaintiffs also fretted that use of the Sony Betamax would cross
"invisible boundaries" and that "the copyright owner has lost control over his program."
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd
in part, rev'd in part,659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

HeinOnline -- 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 210 2012

2012]

INFORMATION-GATHERING APPROACH

211

Supreme Court rejected these alleged harms as unproven and
unlikely.199 Content owners were unable to convince the district court
that Sony's Betamax posed a serious threat to advertising revenue, partly
because, on the then-current state of the technology, editing out ads
during recording or skipping over them during playback was not
particularly feasible.200 The Betamax of the late 1970s and early 1980s
was equipped with a pause button and a fast-forward control, but these
were clunky mechanical devices which if used with any frequency,
degraded the quality of the magnetic tape. To edit ads while recording
required watching those same ads with great attention. To skip ads
during playback required jumping back and forward with great
imprecision to land at the right spot such that it was often easier to just
watch the commercials.201
In retrospect, the content owners' attempted quick strike against
the perceived dangers of the VCR was blunted by its preemptory
nature-content owners could not prove the damage they feared the
VCR would inflict.202
Sony's second legacy in terms of content-technology disputes is the
legal safe harbor from secondary liability for copyright infringement.203
Identifying consumer time-shifting as fair use did not fully resolve the
legal controversy in Sony. Surveys conducted by both the plaintiffs and
the defendant indicated that, although the primary use of the VCR was
time-shifting, a significant portion of consumers also used the device to
build personal libraries of copyrighted material, something the majority
and the minority of the Court regarded as infringement.204 Accordingly,
the Sony Court also addressed the liability of a technology manufacturer
for foreseeable infringement by users. 205 The majority of the Court held
199 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 452-55 (citing and approving the district court's decision that home
time-shifting was fair use); Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 466-67 (holding the alleged
harm from time-shifting did not justify an injunction). The Supreme Court went on to reason
that "respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of
nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works." Sony,
464 U.S. at 456.
200 See Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 468 (rejecting plaintiffs' speculations as to
Betamax users' avoiding of advertisements and the resulting effect on advertisement revenue).
201 It is important to recognize that although the majority was unwilling to simply assume
that the harms suggested by content owners would come to pass, it did not set the bar especially
high. The majority did not require the plaintiffs to show with certainty that future harm would
result, it merely required "showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful
likelihood of future harm exists." Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
202 Id. at 454-56.
203 See Sverker K. Hogberg, The Search for Internet-BasedDoctrines of Secondary Liability in
Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 921-24 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Sony as creating a safe harbor against contributory infringement liability).
204 Sony, 464 U.S. at 423-24.
205 See id. at 439-42 (reasoning that if vicarious liability was to be imposed on petitioners, it
must rest on the fact that they sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their
customers may use the equipment for unauthorized uses).
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that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product
is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringinguses."206
The substantial noninfringing use test, or the "Sony safe harbor" as
it has come to be known, has been an important and controversial
feature of copyright law ever since.207 A number of academics have
criticized Sony for its failure to give technologists any incentive to
reduce the extent of illegal use of their products once the substantial
noninfringing use threshold has been satisfied.208 These critics would
prefer, presumably, an assessment equivalent to the Hand Formula in
negligence, which holds that a duty is breached if the burden of
precaution is less than the expected loss due to a failure to take
precautions.209 If a corporation has a duty to ensure its VCRs will not
cause electrocution, why not impose a duty to prevent copyright
infringement? Turning the Sony safe harbor into a balancing test would
be more efficient in a world of swift, cheap and unerring adjudicationnamely, in a world where courts possessed good information about the
costs and benefits of a technology. Balancing in copyright, however,
cannot be exact because statutory damages inflate the harm part of the
equation in the actors' respective utility-maximization problems.
Moreover, in the real world-where threats of litigation are used
strategically, litigation itself is slow and expensive, and fact finders
struggle to understand technological issues and avoid hindsight bias-a
balancing test exposes technology developers, even those acting in the
upmost good faith, to substantial risks.210 Inventors and entrepreneurs
complain that they have no way of knowing what a court will make of
206 Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
207 The exact contours and correct application of the Sony safe harbor have been extensively

litigated in connection with peer-to-peer file sharing software. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931-34 (2005) (analyzing the lower courts'
application of the Sony rule); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649-55 (7th Cir.
2003) (applying the Sony safe harbor test to determine the extent to which Aimster was a
contributory infringer); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir.
2001) (applying the Sony safe harbor test to impose contributory liability when linked to
demonstrated infringing use of the Napster system).
208 See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Copyright As Entry Policy: The Case of DigitalDistribution,47
ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002).
209 United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see, e.g., Brief of Amici

Curiae Kenneth J. Arrow et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2-3, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913; see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164 (1998) (No. 04-480).
210 Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. & In re Aimster Litigation:A Study of
Secondary Copyright Liability in the Peer-to-Peer Context, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485, 507
(2005); see also Lisa M. Mottes, Note, The Need for FederalPreemption of State Tort Claims in
the Context of "New Drugs" and Premarket-Approved Medical Devices, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
723, 756 (2011) (noting that the Food and Drug Administration preemption of state tort claims
can encourage litigation "because the threat of liability and expensive litigation arguably deter
the development of new technology").
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their infringement-mitigation attempts by the time a case goes to
trial.211 Under a balancing test, technology developers must predict the
second-guesses of judges and juries as to technology and also attempt to
forecast the evolution of markets and business practices.
The Sony majority's adoption of a safe harbor for emerging
technology rather than a least-cost-avoider balancing test indicates a
preference for clear thresholds of liability over an idealized (and possibly
illusory) optimization of incentives. 212 The Sony safe harbor is a clear
rule in the sense that it provides technology developers with an ex ante
assurance that, as long as the substantial noninfringing use threshold
has been met, distribution of their product will not trigger massive
copyright liability.213
The exact boundary of the substantial noninfringing use test is
debatable: for example, reasonable people may well have concluded that
Napster's marginal capacity for legitimate uses was in fact insubstantial.
However, not all uncertainties are created equal. New technology will
almost inevitably pose unknowable future harms and benefits; any test
requiring a technology developer to mitigate the latter while maximizing
the former creates not just uncertainty, but profound uncertainty. In
contrast, while the borderlands of the substantial noninfringing use test
may be disputed, there is a clear field beyond the border where the
legality of a new device cannot be seriously disputed. In practice,
technology developers may have to over-shoot the substantial
noninfringing use mark to be completely confident, but the point is that
such confidence is possible.214 This confidence comes at a potential cost
because it is possible that, once satisfied that they have crossed the
substantial noninfringing use threshold, technology providers who
could do more to restrain consumer copyright infringement would rest
on their laurels.
Reflecting on the Sony decision some twenty years later in Grokster
v. MGM, Justice Breyer indicated that the majority in Sony was well
aware of this trade off and settled upon the Sony safe harbor precisely
because the rule was "strongly technology protecting."215 Justice Breyer
argued that, in view of uncertainty of any balancing test and the
"limitations facing judges where matters of technology are concerned,"
it was important to have a rule that gave new technology breathing
space to develop and thus, for emerging technologies, the mere
capability of a substantial noninfringing use would be enough to shelter

211

Matthew Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and

DoctrinalEfficiency, 81 TUL. L. REv. 187, 221-22 (2006).
212 Id.
213 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring).
214 See infra notes 244-249 and accompanying text.
215 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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them from secondary liability for the alleged infringements of endusers. 2 16 The Sony decision reflects an awareness of the information
constraint courts operate under with respect to new technology and a
calculation that any gains made for copyright owners by virtue of a
higher standard of care would be outweighed by the costs imposed on
innovation.217 As Justice Breyer notes, VCRs, compact disc burners,
digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and peerto-peer software have all benefited from the Sony safe harbor.218
The Sony decision also has significant implications for contenttechnology disputes for a third reason. As discussed already, Sony is
both copyright policy and innovation policy. Furthermore, to the extent
that copyright governs who is allowed to enter the market for new
technologies of production, reproduction and dissemination, the Sony
ruling is also competition policy.219
Copyright law establishes and orders a complex set of incentives
for the creation and distribution of expressive works, such as books,
music, movies, and software. However, copyright is not merely the law
of the book; it is also the law of the printing press. Copyright law plays a
substantial role in regulating the technologies of creation and
distribution.220 If the Supreme Court had held Sony Corporation liable
for user infringement, it could have given content owners an effective
veto over the development of the VCR.221 This does not mean that we
would not have anything like the VCR in our households, but it might
not have included a record button.222 Alternatively, Congress could have
instituted a compulsory license for home taping with a levy against the
machines, as in Germany.223
If the Supreme Court had adopted a balancing test in Sony, it
would have, in effect, asked potential new entrants to make their
216 Id. at 958.
217 See Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets the
Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 375 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle

Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006) ("I recognize the delicate balance we must make between
protection of the copyright owner and encouragement of new technology." (quoting Justice
O'Connor)).
218 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring).
219 See generallyPicker, supra note 208, at 425 (discussing Sony's impact on entry policy).
220 See id. at 430-32 (discussing the evolution of gatekeeping roles in distribution and
creation).
221 Assuming the other branches of government did not legislate to the contrary.
222 See generally Robin A. Moore, Fair Use and Innovation Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944,
944-45 (2007) (stating that in ruling on Sony, "the fate of the VCR's 'record' button was in the
hands of the United States Supreme Court"); Fara Tabatabai, A Tale of Two Countries:
Canada's Response to the Peer-to-Peer Crisis and What It Means for the United States, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2321, 2369 (2005) (arguing that although the Sony Court did not impose
restrictions on the "evolution of controversial technology{,] ... Sony could have easily avoided
the entire litigation by removing the record button from its VCR").
223 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975,
976 n.4 (2002) (telling the story of the German legislation).
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product design decisions as though they were vertically integrated
subsidiaries of the entertainment industry. This would have had a
substantial effect on the development of the technology because
incumbents and new entrants face very different incentives with respect
to the development of new technology. Companies that are heavily
invested in the status quo are often disinclined to pursue superior new
technologies that will disrupt an existing market.224 This is not because
they fail to recognize the potential of the new technology, but rather
because they appreciate that the new technology will cannibalize the
market share of existing offerings.225 In Greek mythology, the Delphic
oracle foretold that one of Kronos's children would dethrone him.
Kronos, anxious to thwart the prophecy, ate his children as soon as they
were born.226 As Tim Wu explains, "[alnd so derives the Kronos Effect:
the efforts undertaken by a dominant company to consume its potential
successors in their infancy."227 In the eyes of content industries, almost

every significant new technology of reproduction and distribution has
the potential to disrupt existing business models. Properly understood,
the VCR was not a threat to content, so much as the existing business
model of paying for free content distribution by bundling it with
advertising. The film and television industry resisted the VCR in the
1970s for the same reasons that the Radio Corporation of America-as a
vertically integrated content distributor and incumbent technologistresisted Frequency Modulation (FM) radio in the 1930s.228
Content owners have routinely opposed new technologies of
reproduction and distribution regardless of their net benefits to society
because those new technologies challenge existing business models.229

The Sony majority recognized this problem and responded with the protechnology safe harbor. As Justice Breyer notes, the Sony decision
"thereby recognizes that the copyright laws are not intended to
224 While his discussion focuses on the nature of business decisions in regulated
environments, Boies's commentary on the abhorrence with which regulated companies and
agencies view the possibility of emerging competition is nonetheless useful here. See, e.g., David
Boies, Deregulation in Practice, 55 ANTITRUST L. J. 185, 188-89 (1986) ("There is a third
element that tends to affect the nature of business decisions in a regulated
environment.. . .That desire is simply to maintain the status quo, a disinclination for
innovation. Innovation is a source of new competition.").
225 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES

(1997); see also Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797, 824 (2010) (arguing that startup technology companies are important sources of
innovation); Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829,
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL

844-53 (2008) (summarizing Christensen's argument in the context of VCRs).
226 WU, supra note 5, at 24-25.
227 Id. at 25.
228 Id. at 125-33.
229 See Picker, supra note 208, at 457 (identifying the DVR's emergence as another example
of the way in which the move from analog to digital technology alters transaction costs and
puts pressure on the preexisting business model); see also WU, supra note 5.
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discourage or to control the emergence of new technologies, including
(perhaps especially) those that help disseminate information and ideas
more broadly or more efficiently."230
2.

The VCR: The Harm That Never Was

The Sony majority did not accurately foresee how VCR technology
would develop as a result of its decision, but neither did Hollywood. The
VCR did not kill content; for several decades it made it more profitable
than ever. In 1981 the head of the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) told Congress "the VCR is to the American film
producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the
woman home alone."231 And yet, through the 1980s, 1990s, and the
2000s MPAA members earned a significant proportion of their revenues
from VCR, DVD, and BluRay Disc sales.232 Congress did eventually
enact a provision in the DMCA to require that new VCRs comply with
copy control technology.233 But this provision probably arrived too late
to have much effect to protect copyright owners' revenue or to chill
technology. Home video sales are now declining in the face of digital
delivery,234 but even after thirty years it remains a major source of studio
revenue. 235
Although the VCR, and later the DVR, have challenged the
traditional free-to-air broadcasting model, these devices have actually
increased the value proposition offered by cable TV and premium

230 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 957 (2005) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
231 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808,
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1982) (statement of Jack
Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
232 According to the MPAA, there was a $24.9 billion market for DVDs and VHS tapes in
the United States alone in 2005. MOTION PICTURE Ass'N OF AM., 2005 U.S. PIRACY FACT SHEET
5 (2005), available at filmpiracy.wikispaces.com/file/view/USPiracyFactSheet.pdf According to
Digital Entertainment Group, combined home video sales were $13.9 billion in 1999, $20.7
billion in 2003, peaked at $21.8 billion in 2004, and fell from $21.0 billion in 2008 to $18.8
billion in 2010. See DEG Year-End Home EntertainmentReports, Digital Entertainment Group,
http://www.degonline.org/ (follow "News" link in banner; then follow "New Releases" link)
(last updated Aug. 3, 2012).
233 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(1)(A) (2006).
234 The real challenge to the broadcast model is not commercial avoidance-it is digital
distribution through Internet streaming services and Internet downloads. Amazon and Netflix
currently offer a wide range of content via subscription streaming services; Amazon and
AppleTV allow users to pay for permanent individual downloads; and Hulu.com and Tv.com
offer internet streaming supported by target advertising.
235 As Fred von Lohmann notes: "The VCR made possible the home video market, a market
which today generates more than double the revenues collected at the box office...." von

Lohmann, supra note 225, at 840-41.
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channels such as HBO. The ability to time-shift programming makes it
worthwhile to pay more for programming. So rather than consumer
paying very indirectly through advertising, they now pay somewhat
more directly through cable companies. Thus the decline in traditional
broadcast markets is offset by the growth in pay-television
subscriptions.236 Indeed, renting out DVR equipment has also proved to
be a valuable side-business for the cable companies.
Even in the face of DVR technology, the free-to-air model may not
completely unravel. The average American spent over thirty-two hours
a week watching television according to recent figures. An estimated
111.3 million U.S. households watched the 2012 Super Bowl, a drop
from the record of 116 million U.S. households, which is partly
explained by the 2.1 million online viewers of the game. 237 Advertisingsupported broadcast television has retained a viable core because people
seem to like to watch programs at the same time as everyone else is
seeing them.238 Broadcast television has also responded to the challenge
of the VCR by running advertisements that work at high speed and
moving ads directly into programs via product placement. 239
3.

Sony in Retrospect: The Surprising Virtues of Uncertainty
and Delay

The substantial noninfringing use standard in Sony contains a
surprisingly productive form of ambiguity. The rule appears to be set at
a much lower threshold than the simple least-cost-preventer balancing
test from tort law. A cost-benefit balancing test would require a
technology developer to take active steps to prevent third-party
infringement of intellectual property rights up to the point of zero
marginal social return. In contrast, Sony merely requires of a substantial
noninfringing use to exonerate the defendant, perhaps even just the
possibility of such a use. However, given some uncertainty as to the
content and application of the Sony safe harbor and the substantial risks
of injunctions and statutory damages for copyright infringement,
technology developers may be naturally drawn to over-compliance.
Ironically, the substantial noninfringing use test combined with
uncertainty and risk aversion may actually skew conduct closer to the
236 See The Great Survivor, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2010, at 12-13 ("Pay-television
subscriptions grew by more than 2m in America last year."), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16009155.
237 Brian Stelter, Youths Are Watching, but Less Often on TV, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012.
238 According to The Economist, "[g]ive them devices that allow them to record and play
back programmes easily, and they will still watch live TV at least four-fifths of the time." The
Great Survivor, supra note 236, at 13.
239 Id.
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socially optimal balance than the least-cost-preventer rule that aims at
the social optimum directly.240
The impact of Sony's blurred edges can be seen in the development
of the DVR. Both ReplayTV and TiVo launched their DVRs at the 1999
Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas. While the ReplayTV DVR
could be programmed to skip commercials entirely, TiVo took a less
aggressive stance and programmed its device only to allow fastforwarding.241 The ReplayTV 4000 allowed users to share programs with
others via the "Send Show" feature, thus enabling people to watch
premium content for free. Several television networks, including ABC,
NBC, CBS, Disney, and Paramount Pictures, sued the manufacturer of
the ReplayTV device; the manufacturer agreed to discontinue the
commercial

skip and send show features.242 The manufacturer

eventually filed for bankruptcy and sold its DVR technology, and the
new owner has dropped the redistribution feature.
The ReplayTV DVR may have been able to shelter under Sony's
two key holdings: that time-shifting broadcast television was fair use
and that a manufacturer will not be held liable for user copyright
infringement where the device has a substantial noninfringing use. 243
However, from a business perspective, TiVo was probably right to take a
more conservative approach that made commercials easier to avoid but
did not guarantee the destruction of advertising-supported broadcasting
overnight. The development of the DVR provides an interesting
illustration of self-restraint in the face of uncertainty.
240 Legal delay and legal uncertainty may be productive in that enabling rule makers (courts
or congress) to assess the true impact of a new technology and create better rules. See
Depoorter, supra note 16, at 1844 (arguing that legal uncertainty results because the general
social and economic ramifications are typically unknown when a new technology is
introduced). Due to copyright law's inability to keep pace with the new technological
developments, uncertainty is constantly accompanying copyright law. See generally John E.
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,70
VA. L. REv. 965 (1984) (noting the uncertainty with which parties subject to a standard typically
understand what behavior is required of them).
241 TiVo does feature an undocumented thirty-second skip feature for the technology-savvy.
242 Amended Complaint for, inter alia, Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright
Infringement, Paramount v. ReplayTV, Inc., No. CV 01-9358FMC(EX), 2002 WL 1315811
(Apr. 26, 2002), available at http://w2.eff.org/IP/Video/Paramountv.ReplayTV/20011121
paramountamd_complaint.pdf ("ReplayTV Amended Complaint"); see also Maribel Rose
Hilo, Note, TiVo and the Incentive/Dissemination Conflict: The Economics of Extending
Betamax to Personal Video Recorders, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1043, 1045 (2003) (citing the network
television studios' 2001 lawsuit); Eric A. Taub, ReplayTV's New Owners Drop Features that
Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at C3.
243 DVR legality is an open question. See von Lohmann, supra note 225, at 834 ("Do the
private copies made by .. . TiVo owners fall within the scope of the fair use doctrine? Without
litigation leading to reported federal court rulings, the question is extremely difficult to
answer."); Ethan 0. Notkin, Note, Television Remixed: The Controversy over CommercialSkipping, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 899, 937 (2006) ("As has been
demonstrated, the legality of commercial-skipping continues to be uncertain."). Note also that
the fair use argument in favor of the send show feature is not persuasive.
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When the Apple iPod was released in late 2001, it enabled users to
store "a thousand songs in your pocket," but for most popular music,
there was, at the time, no authorized way to obtain MP3 versions of
those songs. The recording industry was implacably opposed to peer-topeer file sharing and strongly suggested that it regarded "ripping"
compact discs to MP3 as copyright infringement.244 Apple relied on
precedent suggesting that consumer format shifting from CD to MP3
was a fair use. 245 It also relied on that fair use as the substantial
noninfringing use required under Sony. The law helped Apple to be
indifferent to the accusation that iPods were mostly filled with pirated
MP3's from peer-to-peer sites such as Napster.246 However, even though
critics have railed against the iPod on this basis,247 it should not be
overlooked that Apple took several steps beyond what was required to
reduce the infringing use of iPods. Most significantly, Steve Jobs's
concerns about music piracy led Apple to change the iPod's design so
that music could only be synced from a single computer to a single iPod
and not the other way around.248 In other words, Apple deliberately
impeded the ability of the iPod to act as a music-sharing device. Less
significantly, Jobs also decreed that the iPod would have a transparent
sticker over the screen commanding "Don't Steal Music."249
Another example of the surprising benefits of uncertainty comes
from the world of peer-to-peer file sharing. It is hard to tell whether
Napster gave much thought to the legal consequences of the wave of
illegal peer-to-peer file sharing it unleashed in 1999. If it had, it probably
assumed that its service was protected from contributory liability under
the shelter of Sony's substantial noninfringing use safe harbor. Although
244 See, e.g., Gracenote, Inc. v. Musicmatch, Inc., No. C 02-3162 CW, 2004 WL 1918889, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2004) (discussing ripping tracks from CD's); Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (detailing the
process by which an MP3 file is ripped from an audio CD and stored on a computer's hard
drive).
245 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Rio [a portable MP3 player] merely makes copies in order to render
portable, or 'space-shift,' those files that already reside on a user's hard drive... Such copying
is a paradigmatic noncommercial personal use.").
246 See Andy McCue, iPod Users Are Music Theives Says Ballmer, SILICON (Oct. 4, 2004),
http://www.silicon.com/management/cio-insights/2004/10/04/ipod-users-are-music-thievessays-ballmer-39124642/ ("The most common format of music on an iPod is 'stolen."'); see also
Universal Music to Apple: iPods Are "Repositoriesfor Stolen Music" So Give Us a Cut of Your
Profits!, DVORAK UNCENSORED (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.dvorak.org/blog/2006/11/30/
universal-music-to-apple-ipods-are-repositories-for-stolen-music-so-give-us-a-cut-of-yourprofits/ ("'[Tihese digital music player devices are just repositories for stolen music, and they all
know it,' Morris was quoted as saying at the time. 'So it's time to get paid for it."' (quoting
UMG's chief executive Doug Morris) (alterations omitted)).
247 Id.

248 STEVEN LEVY, THE PERFECT THING: HOW THE IPOD SHUFFLES COMMERCE, CULTURE,
AND COOLNESS 49 (2006).
249 Id.
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peer-to-peer file sharing software in general is clearly capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, 250 the Ninth Circuit held that "Napster's
actual, specific knowledge of direct infringement render[ed] Sony's [sic]
holding of limited assistance to Napster."251 As the court explained,
Napster's centralized indexing of music files made it aware of the
availability of specific infringing material on the Napster system. The
company's failure to purge this material from its system meant that it
knew of and thus contributed to direct infringement.252
After Napster came a new generation of peer-to-peer sites,
including Grokster and Streamcast. These new services learned the
specific lesson of A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.-avoid a centralized file
structure that would allow for identification and removal of offending
material-but failed to learn the general lesson that the Sony safe harbor
can't be invoked as a pretext to shield a deliberate program of
infringement. In apparent conformity with Napster, the district court in
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. held that, absent any specific
information that identifies infringing activity, the defendants could not
be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of
the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.253 The court
recognized that "Defendants may have intentionally structured their
businesses to avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while
benefitting financially from the illicit draw of their wares," but it
declined to "expand existing copyright law beyond its well-drawn
boundaries" to remedy this problem and called for "additional
legislative guidance" from Congress instead.254
Confronted with substantial evidence of the harm that file sharing
was doing to the music industry,255 and the defendants' evident
"purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright
infringement,"256 the Supreme Court forged a new doctrine of

250 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 954 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (recognizing the "significant future market for noninfringing uses of
Grokster-type peer-to-peer software").
251 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Note that the district court
had proclaimed a standard of commercially significant noninfringing uses. See A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916-18 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
252 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
253 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (citing Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442-43 (1984))).
254 Id. at 1046.
255 The true extent of this harm continues to be disputed. Compare Felix Oberholzer-Gee &
Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 115 J. POL.
ECON. 1 (2007) (finding that file sharing has had only a limited effect on record sales), with
Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?,49 J.L. & ECON.
1, 9 (2006) (finding a significant effect).
256 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005). The
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inducement-based liability of copyright infringement. Borrowing a
concept from patent law, the Court held that "one who distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties."257 Those who induce infringement are pushed out from under
the Sony umbrella.
The judicial response to peer-to-peer file sharing illustrates some of
the flexibility of what is effectively a common law standard. Courts have
refined the application of Sony over the years in response to new
information about the potential blind spots of the rule itself and new
information about the costs and benefits of new technologies.
D.

Record Labels and Webcasters

This case study focuses on "non-interactive" streaming of recorded
music over the Internet, which is a rather clumsy way of saying
webcasting in the now familiar sense of Internet radio services such as
Pandora or Live365.com.258
1.

The Quagmire of Webcasting Royalty Arbitration

Congress has adopted four different frameworks for determining
the terms and conditions of the compulsory licenses needed for Internet
radio webcasting over the past fifteen years. In 1998, Digital Millennium
Copyright Act set up a process of arbitration under the jurisdiction of
the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel.259 The mechanics of
arbitration were overhauled in 2002 under the Small Webcaster
Settlement Act,260 and again by the Copyright Royalty and Distribution
Reform Act of 2004.261 Still dissatisfied with the lack of inter-industry
Court went on to reason "each company showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of
demand for copyright infringement," which the Court recognized as "indicat[ing] a principal, if
not exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about infringement." Id. at 939. Further,
"evidence of the distributors' words and deeds going beyond distribution as such shows a
purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright infringement." Id. at 941.
257 Grokster,545 U.S. at 919. Whether the Court framed the inducement doctrine correctly is
another question, but beyond our current scope.
258 Also referred to as webcasting, but that term is commonly used in a more general sense
as well.
259 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
260 Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780; see also
Vanessa Van Cleaf, Note, A Broken Record: The DigitalMillennium Copyright Act's Statutory
Royalty Rate-Setting Process Does Not Work for Internet Radio, 40 STETSON L. REV. 341, 365
(2010) (outlining Congress's passing of the SWSA and its effects on webcasters).
261 Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat.
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compromise, Congress enacted the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008,262
followed shortly by the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009.263 At the
heart of each of these schemes was an "agree or arbitrate" model that
sought the efficiency of a compulsory license but with responsibility for
rate-setting pushed back to the affected parties, if only they could agree.
Our view is that government intervention in Webcasting has largely
been a failure (or perhaps a string of failures, followed by marginal
success). Making this claim necessitates a detailed review of the history
of the webcasting rate-setting process. This review highlights a number
of salient lessons for government intervention to resolve contenttechnology disputes that we summarize at the end of this Section.
2.

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act-An
Uncertain Foundation

In the early 1990s the recording industry began to understand that
perfect digital reproduction and efficient Internet distribution were a
threat to its business model grounded in physical distribution.264 The
industry warned Congress "digital delivery would siphon off and
eventually eliminate the major source of revenue for investing in future
recordings" and that "[o]ver time, this [would] lead to a vast reduction
in the production of recorded music."265 Responding to these concerns,
in 1995, Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act (the DPRSRA), adding a limited exclusive right in the
performance of sound recordings "by means of a digital audio
transmission" to the bundle of rights in section 106 of the Copyright
Act. 266
The 1995 legislation was a significant change in the law. Prior to
the DPRSRA, a public performance of recorded music implicated only
the copyright in the musical composition; 26 7 recording artists and
2341.
262 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974.
263 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926.
264 Digital PerformanceRight in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1506 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 34
(1995) (statement of Jason Berman, Chairman and CEO, Recording Industry Association of
America).
265 Id.; see also BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 221-25 (1995), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/front.pdf (advocating a sound recording
performance right).
266 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006)).
267 These rights are often retained by individual songwriters and are commonly
administered by collective rights organizations, principally administered by ASCAP and BMI.
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producers received no compensation for the performance of the sound
recording as such. The DPRSRA gave the copyright owners of sound
recordings a digital performance right, but subjected that right to
important exceptions and, in certain cases, to a compulsory licensing
regime. 268 The DPRSRA was drafted at a time when the recording
industry realized that people might want to stream individual songs
over the Internet instead of owning them, but before the industry
understood the full potential of Internet radio.269 Unconstrained by the
expense and oversight that comes with obtaining a broadcasting license
from the FCC, Internet radio had the potential to remake radio.
Webcasting was made possible by the growing number of businesses
and households connected to the Internet and by technical advances in
the digitization of music that made more efficient use of bandwidth.270
In 1995, RealNetworks released a proprietary audio format, RealAudio,
that was suitable for streaming audio in relatively low bit-rates and
made it possible to 'broadcast' over the internet to listeners connected
by dialup modems.271 The DPRSRA was targeted at new subscription
music services offered by cable, satellite, and Internet service providers.
But it did not seem to envisage the significance of Internet radionamely, non-subscription services supported by advertising.
Under the DPRSRA, "nonsubscription digital audio transmissions"
were treated the same as terrestrial radio stations and were exempt from
the digital audio transmission right.272 In contrast, "noninteractive"
subscription digital transmissions were subject to a compulsory

See Erich Carey, Note, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Will the Copyright Royalty Board's March
2007 Rate Determination Proceedings Pull the Plug on Internet Radio?, 19 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 257, 264 n.32 (2008) (discussing royalty payments to musical
composition copyright owners as typically handled through blanket licenses and administered
by ASCAP, BMI and others).
268 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 109 Stat. 336.
269 "[C]ertain types of subscription and interaction audio services might adversely affect
sales of sound recordings and erode copyright owners' ability to control and be paid for use of
their work." H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995).
270 See generally Joseph E. Magri, New Media-New Rules: The Digital Performance Right
and Streaming Music over the Internet, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 55, 55-56 (2003) (noting the
general increase in Internet access as leading to increase in webcasting); see also ROGER E.
BOHN & JAMES E. SHORT, GLOBAL INFO. INDUS. CTR. UNIV. OF CAL., SAN DIEGO, How MUCH
INFORMATION? 2009 REPORT ON AMERICAN CONSUMERS 19 (2009) ("Ten years ago 40 percent
of U.S. households had a personal computer, and only one-quarter of those had Internet access.
Current estimates are that over 70 percent of Americans now own a personal computer with
Internet access, and increasingly that access is high-speed via broadband connectivity.").
271 See Jesse A. Bland, Note, Biting the Hand That Feeds: Why the Attempt to Impose
Additional Performance Fees on iTunes Is a SearchforDollars Without Sense, 2 HARv. J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 157, 175 (2011) ("Shortly after the DPR[SR]A was enacted [in 1995], the first
technology for streaming audio-RealAudio-was developed and released by Progressive
Networks. Thus webcasting was born, meaning it was now possible to make digital audio
transmissions over the internet.").
272 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
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license,273 and interactive subscription services (i.e., music on demand)
were not eligible for the compulsory license.274 Thus in 1995, the
situation was as follows:

Non-Subscription

Subscription

Non-Interactive

Exempt

Compulsory License

Interactive

Exempt

Must Negotiate

The recording industry soon realized its oversight and began
lobbying for yet another revision to the Copyright Act to bring nonsubscription webcasters within the scope of its newly acquired digital
performance right.275 Thanks to a last-minute addition to the 1998
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) the category of digital
performance right exempt services was limited to "nonsubscription
broadcast transmission[s]."276 Webcasting was no longer exempt from
the digital performance right. Moreover, the DMCA also expanded the
definition of the term "interactive service" to include those that are
"specially created for a particular individual."277 This alteration made

Id. § 114(d)(2).
Id. § 114(d)(3)(C); see Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 150-51
(2d Cir. 2009) (analyzing the DPRSRA and its requirements as to interactive and noninteractive
subscription services); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 673, 692 (2003) (explaining under the DPRSRA, interactive services were subject to
voluntary licensing only).
275 See Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready to Begin, as Soon as We
Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War with Itself, 24 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (2001) (discussing the recording industry's reaction to the Copyright
Act). The RIAA also argued that non-subscription webcasters were in fact already subject to
sound recording royalties by virtue of section 112 of the Act. See id. at 19-20 (identifying the
RIAA's arguments regarding webcasters' subjection to royalty payments); see also Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright Legislationfor the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 137, 167
(1999) (analyzing the Copyright Act's 1995 amendments and the resulting creation of a multitiered system).
276 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Under the statute, a broadcast transmission
was defined as "a transmission made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the
Federal Communications Commission." Id. § 114(j)(3).
277 Id. § 114(j)(7) (defining an "interactive service" as a service "that enables a member of
the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on
273
274
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the status of Internet radio fundamentally uncertain because it raised
the question of whether services offering playlists customized according
to an individual user's ratings of songs, artists, and albums would
qualify for the section 114 statutory license.
In early 2000, a group of webcasters petitioned the Copyright
Office to resolve this uncertainty (in their favor) and urged it to rule that
"a service is not interactive simply because it offers the consumer some
degree of influence over the programming offered by the webcaster."278
The Copyright Office declined this request in a letter dated November
21, 2000, stating blandly that due to the "rapidly changing business
models emerging in today's digital marketplace, no rule can accurately
draw the line demarcating the limits between an interactive service and
a noninteractive service."279 Thus webcasters had to negotiate for
licenses and participate in arbitration without any clear idea of which
box they fell into.

Non-Subscription,
Broadcast
Transmission

NonSubscription,
Non-Broadcast

Subscription

NonInteractive

Exempt

Compulsory
License

Compulsory
License

Interactive

Exempt

Must Negotiate

Must Negotiate

request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program,
which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient."); see also Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 155
(reviewing legislative history of section 114).
278 Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,266,
33,266 (May 23, 2000). The webcasters acted through their lobbying arm, the Digital Media
Association (DiMA). See Petition of Digital Media Association (DiMA) for Rulemaking In Re:
Section 114 Definition of Interactive Service, Docket No. RM 2000-4 (Apr. 17, 2000), available
at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/DiMApetition.pdf; see also Arista Records, 578 F.3d at 156.
279 Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service: Petition for
Rulemaking, Denial Correction, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,434, 77,332 (Dec. 11, 2000) (codified at 37
C.F.R. § 201), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2000/65fr77330.pdf; see Arista
Records, 578 F.3d at 156.
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Webcasting I

In keeping with the agree-or-arbitrate model, the DMCA initially
created a six-month negotiation period for copyright owners and
potential licensees to privately determine royalty rates for webcasting.280
The legislation provided that if no agreement was reached at that time,
the Librarian of Congress would convene a Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panel (CARP) to determine rates on a "willing buyer-willing
seller" standard.281
Although the first proceedings under this regime were intended to
establish royalties for the period 1998-2000, the complexity of the issues
and the number of participants led the Copyright Office to consolidate
proceedings with respect to the first and second licensing periods.282
And so the first CARP proceeding actually determined rates for 19982002.283 On February 20, 2002, the panel submitted its report to the
Copyright Office proposing rates and terms for webcasting.284 The
report came after forty-one days of hearings, seventy-five witnesses,
15,000 pages of transcript, thousands of pages of exhibits, a thousand
pages of post-hearing briefs, and two additional days of legal
arguments.285 The CARP's ultimate recommendation was that
webcasters would pay 0.14 cents per song. 28 6 The CARP based these

280 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(A).
281 Id. § 114(f)(2)(B). See generally Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939,
942 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
282 See Order Granting Consolidation of Proceedings at 2, In re Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings (Library of Cong. Dec. 4, 2000) (Docket Nos. 996 CARP DTRA, 2000-3 CARP DTRA), available at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/
114schedule.html.
283 See id. ("Since these will be consolidated proceedings, the CARP will be establishing rates
and terms for two periods (1998-2000 and 2001-2002) based upon the evidence presented for
each of the two periods.").
284 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE COPYRIGHT
ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANEL TO THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS (2002) [hereinafter CARP
REPORT], availableat www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting-rates.pdf.
285 See Copyright Royalty Arbitration Panel Recommends Statutory License Fees for Internet
Transmissions of Music Recordings, 23 ENT. L. REP., at 45 (Mar. 2002), available at
http://er.carolon.net/BI/v23n10.pdf. It is also worth noting that:

Under the current system, the Copyright Office convenes three-member panels
of independent arbitrators to review cases as they arise. The panels hold trial-like
proceedings, and then make recommendations to the Register of Copyrights and the
Librarian of Congress, who oversee the office. But complex cases can drag on for
months, and because arbitrators are paid as much as $400 an hour, some proceedings
can cost more than $1 million. Another complaint is that each panel may use
different criteria in setting rates, which some participants complain leads to
inconsistencies in outcomes and makes it hard to set precedents.
Andrew Caffrey, E-Commerce (A Special Report): The Rule-Rules & Regs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,
2002, at R13.
286 CARP REPORT, supra note 284, at 80. A per song royalty rate refers to the amount paid to

HeinOnline -- 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 226 2012

2012]

INFORMATION-GATHERING APPROACH

227

rates on its analysis of a hypothetical "willing seller-willing buyer"
marketplace, as supposedly evidenced by agreements negotiated in the
marketplace.287
In retrospect, the notion that in a time of technological and legal
uncertainty webcasters and the recording industry would manage to
arrive at voluntary agreements in lieu of arbitration seems almost naive.
Knowing that they could continue to operate and rely on arbitration,
neither side had particularly strong incentives to reach a voluntary
agreement. 288 The prospects of an agreement were further undermined
by the willing seller-willing buyer decision standard under which the
CARP operated. The RIAA formed a committee of five major record
labels to execute a common strategy for negotiating with prospective
licensees.289 The recording industry's main objective in these
negotiations was to establish a favorable track record to use as evidence
in the arbitration proceedings-there is every indication that the
industry was primarily concerned with arbitration and did not see
individual negotiations as a viable alternative.290 But the failure of
negotiations cannot be attributed to the recording industry alone. In its
review of the CARP report, the Librarian of Congress was also critical of
webcasters, noting that "most Webcasters chose not to enter into
marketplace agreements, preferring to wait for the outcome of the
CARP proceeding in the hope of getting a low rate."291 Even if the
recording industry had come to the table, uncertainty and optimism
combined to make webcasters resistant to entering into good faith
negotiations.292
This left the CARP with the unenviable task of ascertaining what a
willing webcaster and a willing record label would consider to be a fair
deal for Internet radio royalties in the face of an almost total absence of
real world evidence. The one agreement that the CARP believed was
negotiated in good faith between parties on an equal footing was the
play a song once to a single user. The rate of fourteen cents per song translates to a bill of
$18,369 for a station with an average of 100 listeners that plays music twenty-four hours a day,
365 days a year. This is based on the assumption that the average song is four minutes long. See
Ira Hoffman, Note, Pseudo-Interactivity:An Appropriate Rate Scheme for Customizable Internet
Radio Services, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1515, 1524 (2011) (noting that many songs average
between three and four minutes in length and therefore many Internet radio stations can play
roughly sixteen songs per hour). The CARP also recommended that radio stations, who pay
nothing to record labels for terrestrial transmissions, would pay seven cents per song. Id. at 7778.
287 CARP REPORT, supra note 284, at 80.
288 Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,245 (July 8, 2002) [hereinafter
Final Rule] (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 261).
289 Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of Cong., 394 F.3d 939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
290 Id.
291 Final Rule, supra note 288, at 45,246.
292 Id.
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RIAA-Yahoo! agreement. 293 The panel based its entire assessment of the
willing buyer-willing seller standard on this solitary agreement. There
are several reasons to doubt the wisdom of this approach. To begin with,
Yahoo, one of the leading Internet companies of its time, could hardly
be thought to be representative of the emerging Internet radio industry.
Moreover, when the only market evidence that exists consists of
transactions conducted with at least one eye towards the ensuing
arbitration process, these agreements simply cannot be a sound basis for
extrapolating what the outcome of a functioning market process would
have been.294 The willing buyer-willing seller standard was always going
to be difficult for the CARP to implement because the digital audio
performance right has never existed independently of the compulsory
licensing regime. In light of this fact, the CARP should have looked
beyond negotiated agreements for an empirical basis to ground its
determination on what the equilibrium of a hypothetical market should
be.
The 2002 CARP determination was immediately challenged by
webcasters as unworkable.295 They argued that, if approved, the new fees
would cause many of them to shut down.296 Internet radio stations
received a "stay of execution" from the Copyright Office in May 2002
with the announcement that the Registrar of Copyrights would not
accept the panel's recommendations.297 However, cheers were shortlived. Webcasters were seeking a revenue-based fee roughly equal to
what they paid songwriters and publishers, rates that are determined by
negotiations with ASCAP and BMI or by rulings of the federal district
court in New York that supervises the PRO antitrust consent decrees.298
Although the Library of Congress rejected royalty rates determined by
CARP as being arbitrarily high, it only reduced the per-song, perlistener royalty from 0.14 to 0.07 cents. 299 Given the information
available, this figure was necessarily arbitrary, if not arbitrarily high. The
Library of Congress's final order was met with the same reaction as the
293 Id. at 45,248.

294 See FED. R. EVID. 502 (outlining work product doctrine).
295 See, e.g., Online Radio Plans "Silent" Protest of Fees, HOUS. CHRON., May 1, 2002,
(Business), at 3 (highlighting the Internet radio stations' argument that the proposed royalty
rates could bankrupt may members of the webcasting industry).
296 David Ho, Royalty Rates for Internet Radio Rejected; Webcasters Feared Approval of
Proposed Fees Would Force Them to Shut Down, WASH. POST, May 22, 2002, at E2. See also Rob
Pegoraro, They're Not Treating Webcasters Like Royalty, WASH. POST, May 26, 2002, at H5 ("If
these forecasts are true, most small webcasters would have to shut down, and Web radio would
walk the same dreary path of corporate consolidation as commercial FM.").
297 Michael Dwyer, The Day the Music Died, AGE (Melbourne, AustI.), Aug. 9, 2007, at 21
availableat http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/08/08/1186530432196.html?page=fullpage.
298 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
299 See Final Rule, supra note 288, at 45,243. The Library of Congress also proposed a
downward adjustment-from 9% of the performance royalties paid to 8.8%-to the Ephemeral
License Fee. Id.
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CARP determination-service providers warned that the destruction of
internet radio was near, 300 and that the ruling "virtually guarantees that
Internet radio will consolidate to the point where there's no distinction
between Internet radio and terrestrial radio."301
The unsatisfactory outcome of the first rate setting process appears
to have been inexorable given its design. The parties failed to enter into
serious negotiations because legal, technological, and market
uncertainty combined to make each side believe that its prospects were
better in arbitration. The Copyright Office had the opportunity to
resolve some of this uncertainty by stating definitively whether
individually customized Internet radio stations should be classified as
"interactive" or "non-interactive." Congress had the opportunity to
establish a more rational arbitration process by directing the panel to
consider parity with the royalties paid by terrestrial radio stations to
songwriters. The arbitration proceedings proved to be adversarial,
complicated, time consuming, and expensive.302
The initial CARP process established high prices and an inflexible
pricing formula (rigid adherence to pay per song as opposed to revenue
sharing) that starved the fledgling Internet radio industry of oxygen.303
This approach deprived the government and private industry of any
opportunity to gather information about the effect of webcasting on
music revenues or develop any understanding of the business prospects
and market opportunities presented by this new technology.
4.

Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002

The failure of the rate-setting system was made apparent when
Congress enacted the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002
(SWSA).304 The SWSA was motivated by the lack of representation of

300 See Christopher Stern, Curtain Call for Webcasts?; Some Decry Order to Pay Royalties to
Musicians, WASH. POST, June 21, 2002, El ("Thousands of Internet radio stations may find
their transmissions financially jammed after the Librarian of Congress yesterday adjusted the
royalty fees that the webcasters must pay musicians and record companies for broadcasting
their songs online.").
301 Jon Healey, U.S. Official Cuts Proposed Royalty for Online Music, L.A. TIMES, June 21,
2002, (Business) pt. 3, at 1 (quoting Kevin Shively, director of www.Beethoven.com) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
302 "[T]he CARP system presented perceived problems of continuity, consistency, and
expense." Procedural Regulations for the Copyright Royalty Board, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,901, 30,901
(May 31, 2005).
303 See generally Karen Fessler, Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 399, 418
(2003) ("This [CARP marketplace] standard, however, proved unworkable... [by) creat[ing] a
one-size-fits-all approach to setting rates, effectively exposing all webcasters .. . to the same rate
structure.").
304 Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, § 2(1), 116 Stat. 2780, 2780
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114). See generally Webcaster Alliance, Inc. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of
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small webcasters in the CARP proceedings and the assessment that such
webcasters were unduly disadvantaged by the high per-performance
royalty fees that resulted from the first round of arbitration.305 The Act
temporarily suspended the CARP fees for small webcasters and
noncommercial webcasters and gave the parties an eighteen-month
window to negotiate alternative arrangements. 306
As with Webcasting I, the SWSA was primarily focused on
inducing a negotiated agreement.307 To improve the prospects of
negotiation, the SWSA entrenched the position of SoundExchange as
the recording industry's representative collective rights organization.308
At this time, SoundExchange was an unincorporated division of the
RIAA, however the organization was spun off in September 2003 and is
now technically an independent, non-profit organization. Although
SoundExchange is often regarded as synonymous with the RIAA, a
board comprised of record labels and recording artist representatives
controls the organization. SoundExchange distributes royalties to record
labels and recording artists under the compulsory license.309 It is the
only entity entitled to collect and distribute digital performance
royalties on behalf of record labels and recording artists.310 Notably, in
spite of its monopoly position, SoundExchange negotiates and lobbies
on behalf of sound recording copyright owners with no oversight from
the antitrust authorities. The Act was structured such that any
agreement entered by SoundExchange, in effect, became the industrywide deal for all small webcasters.31I To encourage SoundExchange to
Am., Inc., No. C 03-3948 WHA, 2004 WL 1465722, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2004) (providing
background information on the SWSA).
305 See Van Cleaf, supra note 260, at 365 (stating that Congress passed the SWSA to address
small webcasters' disdain for the 2002 royalty rates).
306 Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, § 3(1), 116 Stat. 2780, 2781
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114).
307 Jon Healey, Webcasters Free to Reach Deals, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2002, (Business) pt. 3,
at 3 (noting that according to one Washington insider,"[allthough there was a broad consensus
in favor of overhauling the way royalties are set, there wasn't enough time late in the session to
do that" and that consequently, "[tihe main goal was to clear the way for negotiated
settlements, rather than imposing rates and terms on Webcasters").
308 See Final Rule, supra note 288, at 45,267. SoundExchange is a nonprofit organization
formed by RIAA to administer the statutory licenses in sections 112 and 114 of the Copyright
Act. SoundExchange member companies and affiliated record labels account for over 90% of
the sound recordings lawfully sold in the United States. See Gretchen McCord Hoffmann,
Recent Developments in Copyright Law, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 215 n.923 (2003).
309 See Final Rule, supra note 288, at 45,267; see also, Jeffrey Brabec et al., The Continuing
Evolution of U.S. Online/DigitalMusic Licensing: From Pro's and AOL to MobiTv and the CRB,
in TECHNOLOGY AND ENTERTAINMENT CONVERGENCE 2010: HOT BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES

IN "TECHNOTAINMENT" (PLI Intellectual Property, Course Handbook Series 2010).

310 Sound recording copyright owners can still agree to direct individually negotiated
licenses with webcasters.
311 Webcaster Alliance, Inc. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc., No. C 03-3948 WHA,
2004 WL 1465722, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2004). Although, small webcasters electing not to
participate in negotiations with SoundExchange could always adopt the compulsory license
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make compromises, the SWSA also provided that any agreement under
the Act would not have precedential value under the willing buyerwilling seller standard.312 Although this may have made settlements
more likely in the short term, this provision exacerbated the
information deficiency of future arbitration panels.
There were some successes under the SWSA. SoundExchange
negotiated a licensing agreement with a trade association of small
webcasters known as Voice of Webcasters (VOW) in late 2002.313 The
VOW agreement provided a royalty rate based on a percentage of
revenue rather than the Librarian's rates which provides rate per
performance.314 However, many other small webcasters complained that
these rates-either 8% to 12% of revenue or 5% to 7% of expensesremained unacceptably high.315
In 2003, SoundExchange reached a two-year deal on royalties with
a small but significant group of webcasters, including Microsoft, AOL
Time Warner, RealNetworks, and Yahoo!316 The agreement gave
webcasters the option of continuing to pay about 0.07 cents per
song/per listener or to pay about 11% of revenue from subscription
services. 317 Webcasters viewed the agreement as preferable to arbitration
and spending "millions of dollars in a miserable process that's known to
yield bad results,"318 but not by much. For webcasters, this deal was not
a long-term solution, rather it was simply a stopgap to tide them over
until Congress was able to once again revisit the rate setting process. 3 19
5.

Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004

As anticipated, Congress attempted to reboot the troubled ratesetting process in 2004 with the Copyright Royalty and Distribution
under the Librarian's rates. Id. at *6.
312 See Carey, supra note 267, at 279-80 ("However, the rates and terms of agreements made
under the SWSA were to apply only to the time periods specified in those agreements and were
to be given no precedential effect in any future rate-setting proceedings.").
313 See Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law: Past, Present and Future of Online Music
Distribution,22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 379 (2004) (outlining the December 13, 2002
agreement between SoundExchange and VOW).
314 Webcaster Alliance, 2004 WL 1465722, at *6.
315 Healey, supra note 307. Indeed, an alliance of online music broadcasters sued the
recording industry claiming that the rates negotiated under the VOW agreement were part of
an attempt by the RIAA to unlawfully restrain trade and monopolize the music market.
Webcaster Alliance, 2004 WL 1465722, at *20-21 (holding that a federal agency's establishment
of royalty rates for copyrighted materials bars plaintiffs claims under the filed rate doctrine).
316 Jon Healey, RIAA Reaches Deal on Royalties; The Agreement Brings a Truce in the Bitter
Fight Between Webcasters and the Music Industry, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 2003, (Business) pt. 3, at
3.
317 Id.
318 Id. (quoting Jonathan Potter of the Digital Media Association trade group).
319 Id.

HeinOnline -- 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 231 2012

232

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:173

Reform Act (the Reform Act or CRDRA).320 The Reform Act replaced
the CARP with a Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) and replaced the
expensive arbitrators with three permanent Copyright Royalty Judges
(CRJs) to be appointed by the Librarian of Congress.321 In eliminating
the CARP system, the Reform Act of 2004 also largely removed the
Librarian and the Copyright Office from further involvement in royalty
adjustment proceedings.322 Congress retained the 'agree or arbitrate'
structure of the DMCA and the mission of the CRB remained to
encourage settlements and, when necessary, resolve statutory-license
disputes by setting "reasonable rates and terms" for royalty payments
from digital performances.323 Proceedings under the CRB remained
complex and adversarial.324
6.

Webcasting II

The second rate-setting process (Webcasting II) was initiated by
the CRB on February 16, 2005.325 Following three months of essentially
pro-forma failed negotiations, the CRB began hearing testimony and
proposals from interested parties. 326 Proceedings under the CRB were
just as involved as in the previous CARP process. From May 1, 2005,
through November 30, 2006 the CRJs heard forty-eight days of
testimony from thirty-eight witnesses and twenty-five rebuttal
witnesses.327

320 Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat.
2341 (codified in relevant part at 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2006)).
321 See 17 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. "The expectation is that the Copyright Royalty Judges,
appointed to staggered, six-year terms, will provide greater decisional stability, yielding the
advantages of the former Copyright Royalty Tribunal, but with greater efficiency and
expertise." Procedural Regulations for the Copyright Royalty Board, 70 Fed. Reg. 30,901, 30,901
(May 31, 2005). Limits on the Librarian's power to remove CRJs in 17 U.S.C. § 801(i) were
recently declared to violate the Appointments Clause. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Copyright Royalty Bd., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Those limitations have now been
effectively read out of the statute. Id. at 1344.
322 The Register of Copyrights retained a limited role on questions of law. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 802(f)(1)(A)(ii), (1)(D), (2)(B)(i).
323 If parties can agree, rates and terms of a license may be set through voluntary
negotiation. Id. § 114(f)(3). For all parties that do not agree, the Copyright Royalty Judges
conduct adversarial proceedings and issue a determination. Id. § 803. The resulting rate
changes are retroactive. Id. § 803(d)(2).
324 See id. § 803; 37 C.F.R. § 351, et seq. See generally Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright
Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753-55 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reviewing CRB procedures).

325 Blake Holland, The Winding Stream: Entitlement Theories and Intellectual Property
Rights in EmergingMedia Technologies, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 247, 261 (2010).
326 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg.
24,084, 24,085 (May 1, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 380).
327 Id.

HeinOnline -- 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 232 2012

2012]

INFORMATION-GATHERING APPROACH

233

On May 1, 2007 the CRB announced its determination of
webcasting royalties for the period beginning January 1, 2006, and
ending on December 31, 2010.328 Just as in Webcasting I, the CRB
rejected proposals by webcasters that rates be structured as a percentage
of revenue and stuck with a minimum payment per song/per listener
formula. The CRB determined that the statutory rate for commercial
webcasting per song/per listener should increase from 0.08 cents in 2006
to 0.19 cents by 2010.329 Under the new regime, all webcasters would
also pay a $500 minimum annual fee for every "station."330 The almost
three-fold increase in per song webcasting royalties was greeted with
predictable dismay. Webcasters complained that the decision
"threaten[ed] to silence many, and perhaps most, webcasters."331
However SoundExchange embraced this result, saying that it saw merit
"in culling some of the many thousands of Web stations that sprang to
life during the wide-open first years of broadband."332 It is interesting to
note here that it was SoundExchange making the decision as to whether
the market should be in an era of experimentation or consolidation.
SoundExchange represents the interests of record labels and recording
artists; it does not represent the interests of musicians and composers
generally, and certainly not the broader public interest. Neither
Congress nor the Copyright Office appeared to have made an
affirmative determination about the stage of the webcasting market's
development.
Even more dramatic was the effect of the $500 "administrative
charge." Section 114(f)(2)(B) of the Copyright Act required the CRJs to
set a minimum fee for each type of service. 333 Provided with little
evidence of the administrative cost per licensee, the CRB chose to
benchmark the administrative fee against the existing deals
328 A constant feature of webcasting arbitration has been the partial retroactivity of rates. Id.
at 24,085. The Copyright Royalty Judges issued an initial Determination of Rates and Terms
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 803(c)(2) and 37 C.F.R. § 353 on March 2, 2007. After further
proceedings, the Judges denied all the motions for rehearing. See Order Denying Motions for
Rehearing, In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings,
Docket No. 2005-1 C.R.B. D.T.R.A. (Apr. 16, 2007).
329 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg.
at 24,088.
330 Id. at 24,097-98. For noncommercial broadcasters, this minimum fee covered 159,140
aggregate tuning hours (ATH), which is the total number of hours of programming multiplied
by the number of listeners per hour. Id. at 24,099-24,100. For any month in which a
noncommercial broadcaster's ATH exceeds this threshold, non-commercial webcasters were
required to pay the same per-performance rates as the commercial webcasters for the excess
ATH. Id. at 24,100. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 754
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (summarizing Final Rule and Order, Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. Reg. 24,084).
331 Webcasters and Rising Royalty Fees: Paying the Pricefor Innovation?, WASH. POST, Mar.
18, 2007, N2.
332 Id.

333 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B).
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SoundExchange had negotiated with Yahoo and other major
webcasters.334 The CRJs found SoundExchange's proposal of an annual
$500 minimum per station fee to be reasonable for commercial
webcasters.335 What the judges must have overlooked was that while
such a fee would cost an FM radio station simulcasting one channel only
$500, it would cost emerging services such as Live365 and Pandora
millions of dollars more. Pandora, for example, allows each listener
create multiple personal radio stations based on a recommendation
algorithm. Thus Pandora would be charged at least $500 per listener
station in addition to the per song royalties. Live365 and Pandora both
predicted that the new fee regime would drive them out of business.336
This seemingly inadvertent decision penalizing what has turned out to
be the most popular Internet radio format underscores the difficulty of
regulating in a fast changing marketplace.337
7.

Lobbying, Negotiation, and Litigation Following Webcasting II

Webcasters responded to the new rates with a combined strategy of
litigation, lobbying, and negotiation. In addition to the Arista Records,
LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., litigation already discussed, a group of
webcasters also challenged various aspects of the CRB's ruling and the
constitutionality of the appointment of the CRJs.338 In Intercollegiate
Broadcast System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board,339 the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the CRJ's imposition of a $500
minimum fee for commercial and noncommercial webcasters on the
334 See Brian Flavin, A Digital Cry for Help: Internet Radio's Struggle to Survive a Second
Royalty Rate Determination Under the Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard, 27 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REv. 427, 447-48 (2008) (noting the CRB opted to use SoundExchange's interactive
webcasting benchmark).
335 See Carey, supra note 267, at 292 ("The CRB also imposed a $500 minimum fee on each
station or channel operated by a webcaster." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

336 See Mike Musgrove, HigherMusic Royalties Create Static on the Net; Web Radio Stations
Sing the Blues to Congress,WASH. POST, May 19, 2007, at D1 (noting that Live365's costs would
increase from $1.4 million a year to $7 or $8 million a year); Webcasters and Rising Royalty

Fees, supra note 331 (noting claims by Pandora that the cost that would drive the company out
of business almost instantly).
337 The Judges do not appear to have understood the implications of their decision. See
Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
("[I]n only two footnotes do they appear aware of the possibility of individual licensees paying
more than $500. Even in the Judges' discussion of 'side channels'-which included an example
of one licensee being charged $1000-they do not seem to anticipate the possibility of a
webcaster paying hundreds of thousands of dollars or more." (citations omitted)).
338 Royalty Logic's challenge to the appointment of the Copyright Royalty Judges on the
grounds that it violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution of the United States was
dismissed on the grounds that it had forfeited consideration of the issue by not raising it in
initial briefing before the court. Id.
339 Id.
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grounds that it was arbitrary.340 However, the CRB's royalty
determinations and its selection of SoundExchange as the exclusive
agent to collect and distribute royalties were affirmed. 341
Paralleling these judicial proceedings, several webcasters pursued
private negotiations with SoundExchange. These negotiations were
assisted by significant pressure from Congressional figures, including
the chairman of the House Judiciary's Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet and intellectual property. 342 In June 28, 2007, the House
Committee on Small Business convened a hearing to assess the impact
of the CRB's royalty rate increases on recording artists and
webcasters.343 In response, SoundExchange offered to let small
webcasters with less than $1.2 million in annual revenue pay a reduced
rate based on a percentage of gross revenues. 344 This deal, which was
concluded in August 2007, allowed qualified small commercial
webcasters to pay the same rates they had been paying since 1998.345 In
the media, this compromise was directly attributed to the intervention
of influential lawmakers in the House and Senate.346
8.

Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008

The pressure on Congress in the wake of Webcasting II led directly
to the enactment of the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 (WSA
2008).347 The aim of the WSA 2008 was to facilitate further negotiated
compromises. To this end the WSA 2008 gave SoundExchange the
authority to enter into royalty fee agreements with webcasters as an
alternative to the rates established under the CRB's decision.348 This
effectively changed the institutional design from "agree-or-arbitrate" to
"agree, or arbitrate and then try to agree." Three negotiated royalty
agreements were made under the authority of the WSA 2008: one with
340 Id. at 772. The court remanded the portion of the district court's determination to the
CRJ's for further proceedings. Id.
341 Id. at 770-71.
342 News Release, SoundExchange Extends Offer to Small Webcasters (May 22, 2007) (on file
with author).
343 H.R. REP. No. 110-926 (2009).
344 John L. Simson, executive director of SoundExchange, said at the time, "There's a sense
in the music community and in Congress that small webcasters need more time to develop
their businesses ... We look at it as artists and labels doing their part to help small operators
get a stronger foothold." Mike Musgrove, Music Group Offers Some Web Radio Sites a Break,
WASH POST, May 23, 2007, D2.
345 Shaun Assael, Online and on the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 2, at 32.
346 Id.
347 H.R. REP. No. 110-941 (2009) (discussing motivation and noting that "there was
substantial controversy concerning a June 2007 Copyright Office Royalty Board decision").
348 See Carey, supra note 267, at 307 (outlining the statutory authority the WSA granted
SoundExchange).
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the Corporation for Public Broadcasting agreeing on rates for NPR,
Public Radio International and about 450 public radio stations; 34 9
another with the National Association of Broadcasters dealing with the
royalties payable for terrestrial radio simulcasts;350 and a third
agreement with a limited number of small webcasters.351
SoundExchange was unable to conclude additional agreements with
other small and large webcasters within the time allotted by the 2008
WSA.352 Thus, by January 5, 2009, when the CRB announced that it
would soon begin the Webcasting III proceedings (to determine rates
for the next royalty period running from January 1, 2011 through
December 31, 2015), the industry still had not managed to deal with the
fallout of the Webcasting II determination.353
9.

Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 and the "PurePlay Settlement"

In 2009 Congress passed a second Webcaster Settlement Act to
allow webcasters and SoundExchange an additional thirty days to reach
an agreement over royalties.354 With this additional time,
SoundExchange was able to negotiate what is commonly referred to as
the "PurePlay Settlement" in July 2009.355 The PurePlay Settlement gave
webcasters the option of an alternative rate structure for the period 2006
to at least 2014.356 The details of the new royalty rates depend on
webcaster size and business model. Under the agreement, webcasters
with significant advertising revenue pay a minimum of 25% of revenue
or a per performance fee starting at 0.08 cents and increasing to 0.14
cents by 2015.35 The agreement effectively reduced the rates established
349 Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg.
9293, 9293-94 (Mar. 3, 2009); see also Andrew Stockment, Note, Internet Radio: The Case for a
Technology Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2149 n.124 (2009) ("These rates
apply to 450 public radio webcasters, including Corporation for Public Broadcasting supported
stations, NPR and NPR members ... and others.").
350 Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. at
9294.
351 HOUSE REPORT ON THE WEBCASTER SETTLEMENT ACT OF 2009, H.R. REP. No. 111-139
(2009).
352 Id. Note that in mid-2007 SoundExchange indicated that it would agree to cap per
stations fees at $50,000 a year, thus offering a lifeline to Live365 and Pandora, however no
agreement resulted from this proffered concession. See Jeff Leeds, Reprieve on Royalty Increase
Being Pursuedfor Internet Radio, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at C4 (outlining SoundExchange's
offer).
353 Digital Performance in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 74 Fed. Reg. 318
(Jan. 5, 2009).
354 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926.
355 Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 74 Fed. Reg.
34,796, app. A [hereinafter PurePlay Settlement].
356 Id. art. 1.2(h).
357 Id. art. 4.2(b)(i)-(ii).
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by the CRB for calendar years 2006 to 2010 and established rates for
calendar years 2011 to 2015 that were lower than the CRB schedule.358
Under the PurePlay Settlement, webcasters with less than $1.25 million
in revenue have the option of paying 12-14% of revenues instead of the
0.19 cents per performance ordered by the CRB in the Webcasting II
determination.3s9 The PurePlay Settlement requires webcasters to
provide more information to SoundExchange and to pay an annual
minimum fee of $25,000, redeemable against future royalty payments. 360
The PurePlay Settlement was the product of more than two years of
drawn-out negotiations in the shadow of legislative intervention.361
During these negotiations webcasters and SoundExchange made their
case to the media and to Congress. For example, in 2008 Pandora had
warned that it was approaching "a pull-the-plug kind of decision" if it
was unable to secure a better deal from SoundExchange.362 Not to be
outdone, SoundExchange complained that Internet radio stations had
done too little to make money from webcasting.363
The PurePlay Settlement offered a significant lifeline for
commercial webcasters.364 However, both SoundExchange and
commercial webcasters made it clear from the beginning that this was
not a stable equilibrium and that they still hoped to improve upon the
terms in the settlement. For its part, SoundExchange has been at pains
to emphasize that the reduced rates in the settlement are 'experimental'
and are not indicative of fair market rates. 365 Likewise, while it endorsed
the PurePlay Settlement, the Digital Media Association (DiMA) also
noted its hope that Congress would return to the issue of digital radio
and "level the playing field" between different forms of digital radio.366
DiMA's position is essentially that this equality is to be achieved by
358

See Claire Cain Miller, Music Labels Reach Online Royalty Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009,

at B2.
PurePlay Settlement, supra note 355, art. 4.3(i).
Id. art. 4.2(b)(i)-(ii); see also Miller, supra note 358, at 2. Note, however, that the
PurePlay Settlement does not apply to webcaster services for AOL and Yahoo.
361 See, e.g., Leeds, supra note 352 (reporting on contemplated legislation to reduce
webcasting fees and SoundExchange's suggested terms of agreement); Catherine Rampell, Web
Radio Seeks Resolution; Senate Hearing to Take Up Royalty Fees for Online Stations, WASH.
POST, Oct. 24, 2007, at D2.
362 Peter Whoriskey, Web Radio Giant Nears "Last Stand;" Pandora,Other Services Struggle
Under High Song Fees, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2008, at Al (quoting Tim Westergren, Pandora's
founder).
363 Id. (quoting Mike Huppe, General Counsel for SoundExchange).
364 See Miller, supra note 358, at 2 (forecasting that "Internet radio, once on its deathbed, is
likely to survive after all").
365 See Press Release, SoundExchange and PurePlay Webcasters Reach Unprecedented
Experimental Rate Agreement (July 7, 2009), available at http://musicindustrynewswire.com/
2009/07/07/minl866_210333.php.
366 Statement from Jonathan Potter, Exec. Dir. of the Digital Media Association (July 7,
at
http://www.digmedia.org/news/press-releases/ 157-digital-mediaavailable
2009),
association-comments-on-soundexchange-and-pureplay-webcaster-rate-agreement.
359
360
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Internet radio stations paying less and terrestrial radio stations paying
more.367

10.

Lessons Learned

No one can look back at the successive incarnations of the
webcasting agree-or-arbitrate model with satisfaction. Even if one
regards the PurePlay Settlement as a positive outcome, the years
between the DMCA in 1998 and the settlement in 2009 amount to over
a decade of lost opportunity. It is impossible to know what technological
and business innovations might have come about in a climate more
conducive to investment in that period. Moreover, the PurePlay
Settlement is not a stable equilibrium. The rates established under the
settlement make the business of Internet radio seemed quite tenuous.
Pandora currently spends about half of its gross revenues on licensing
fees payable to rights owners. 368 Reading Pandora, Inc.'s financial
disclosures filed with the SEC in conjunction with its recent IPO, it is
clear that reverting to CRB rates would render its business model
entirely infeasible.369 The settlement rates will expire in 2015 and it is to
be expected that companies like Pandora will be looking to Congress,
not the recording industry, for a sustainable deal on Internet radio
royalties going forward.
On January 5, 2011, the CRB issued its third and most recent
statutory-rate determination for the current license period covering
2011 to 2015 (Webcasting III).370 The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit recently declared that decision unconstitutional on
Appointments Clause grounds.371 Because the court remedied the
constitutional problem in a straightforward fashion,372 however, we
expect a newly reconstituted CRB to reach a similar decision.
367 In the U.S., terrestrial radio stations pay for the public performance of musical works, but
there is no corresponding general public performance right with respect to sound recordings.
368 Pandora Media, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S1) (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1230276/0001193125
11032963/dsl.htm. Pandora calls these fees "content acquisition costs."
369 Id. ("The CRB, which still has rate-making authority over us upon expiration of our
agreement with SoundExchange, has consistently established royalty rates that would, if paid by
us, consume an unsustainable percentage of our revenue. If we are unable to reach a new
agreement with SoundExchange for the period after 2015, it could have an adverse effect on our
business, financial condition and results of operations.").
370 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 76 Fed. Reg.
13,026 (Mar. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 380). The rates are per-performance (perplay) are as follows: 2011-$0.0019; 2012-$0.0021; 2013-$0.0021; 2014-$0.0023; 2015$0.0023. Id. at 13,047-48.
371 Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337, 1343
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
372 Id. at 1344.

HeinOnline -- 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 238 2012

2012]

INFORMATION-GATHERING APPROACH

239

Webcasting III illustrates the gravitational influence of prior
determinations. This latest CRB decision did not take account of the
rates negotiated under the PurePlay Agreement. Indeed, to participate
in PurePlay, webcasters had to agree to opt out of the Webcaster III
rate-setting proceedings.373 This explains why only one commercial
broadcaster, Live365, participated in the 2010 hearings.374
Virtually the only new information the CRB had to go on in
Webcasting III was the SoundExchange deals with Sirius XM and the
National Association of Broadcasters. However, these agreements were
not the product of an undistorted, willing buyer-willing seller
marketplace. They were negotiated in the shadow of, and closely track
the statutory rates set in, the Webcasting II determination. As well as
excluding PurePlay, the CRB does not consider satellite or terrestrial
radio licenses as points of comparison.
The agree-or-arbitrate model was flawed in its conception because
the parties had little incentive to agree and rational arbitration was
predicated on pre-existing agreements as evidence for a willing buyerwilling seller determination. The CARP process and its successors
allowed the recording industry (including labels and artists) to negotiate
collectively without antitrust scrutiny and substantially reduced the
incentives for any individual label or artist to strike a deal with
individual webcasters.375 The prospects of a private agreement were also
diminished by the considerable uncertainty as to the outcome of the
arbitration proceeding-with no real guidance as to the likely outcome,
each was free to believe its most optimistic forecast and was thus
reluctant to compromise. Because the industry was so new and the
parties almost irreconcilable in their views as to the underlying merits of
paying any royalties at all, there was virtually no track record for the
arbitrators to ground their speculation as to what a willing buyer would
offer and willing seller would accept.
Nor did the conclusion of the first CARP proceeding do much to
resolve that uncertainty. The results of the first arbitration in 2002, and
the second in 2007 were so unpalatable that, rather than providing a
platform for negotiations, they simply shifted the forum of the conflict
373 See FAQ: SoundExchange Agreement With Pureplay Webcasters, RADIO MAGAZINE (July
10, 2009, 9:59 AM), http://www.radiomagonline.com/IT-technology/streaming/webcasterroyalty-faq-0710/.
374 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 76 Fed.
Reg. 13,026, 13,027 & n.4.
375 The labels will experience antitrust scrutiny on another, related front. In March 2012,
SiriusXM sued SoundExchange and the American Association of Independent Music (A2IM)
for allegedly orchestrating a boycott of SiriusXM's efforts to obtain direct licenses from record
labels. See Ed Christman, SiriusXM Files Lawsuit Against SoundExchange and A2IM, Alleging
Licensing Interference, BILLBOARD, Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/
legal-and-management/siriusxm-files-lawsuit-against-soundexchange-1006591952.story
(summarizing the complaint).
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back to Congress and the courts. Congress appears to have settled on
the agree-or-arbitrate model in the hope of catalyzing productive
negotiations between the affected interest groups. However, when the
outcomes of that process proved to be unsatisfactory, Congress was
drawn right back into the conflict from which it had tried to remove
itself.
In hindsight, Congress could have established a better foundation
for royalty arbitration by initially tying sound recording royalties to the
royalties paid to songwriters and then waiting to see what happened.
Alternatively, Congress could have allowed Internet radio stations to
remain exempt as they were under the 1995 legislation. Instead, the
arduous process of arbitration resulted in royalties that were expensive
and inflexible. The prospect of continuing congressional intervention
may have actually discouraged the recording industry from accepting
any compromise earlier in the process.
Instead of monitoring the progression of this new technology and
assessing its impact on the recording industry, Congress, the Copyright
Office, the various arbitration panels, the recording industry and
webcasters proceeded in what was essentially an information vacuum. It
is telling that the decision to move from an era of experimentation to
one of consolidation was ultimately made by the recording industry.
The rates that were ultimately decreed by the various groups of
arbitrators were far too high and too inflexible to realistically allow
webcasting to survive. As a result, the industry was largely stifled until
the PurePlay Settlement of 2009. Because there was very little progress
in webcasting between 1998 and 2009, there were few opportunities to
observe what the technology was capable of and no real information
about the effect of webcasting on music revenues, or the business
prospects and technological opportunities of this new technology.
Another lesson that emerges from webcasting is that arbitration
may be the worst forum in which to resolve conflicts between
established rights owners and the champions of new technology. It is
clear that the adversarial nature of the arbitration favored the powerful
and experienced recording industry over the initially disorganized and
inexperienced webcasters. Webcasters lacked deep institutional
experience in lobbying or working with the Copyright Office.
CONCLUSION

Copyright policy is made, broken and remade by a series of
conflicts between those with an interest in existing content and those
with an interest in new technology. In this Article we have highlighted
government's ongoing institutional role in addressing contenttechnology disputes. As we have explained, it is common to think of
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these conflicts as a distributional contest between content and
technology (that is, who gets the spoils of new technology applied to old
content). But from the perspective of the many government institutions
that make copyright policy, these are informational problems.
Moreover, the process and substance of copyright policy are linked.
Achieving a certain allocation of property rights requires procedures to
maintain that allocation. The proper mix of influences from
government institutions can catalyze bargains between the content firms
and the technology firms. The wrong mix can do the opposite. In this
Article we have applied this framework to a century's worth of contenttechnology disputes: from piano rolls to MP3 players, from the early
days of radio to the current state of webcasting. This analysis sheds
more light on the past, but it also suggests some lessons for the future.
Controversies between copyright owners and new technologists are
not simply resolved by making one-time decisions about the allocation
or design of property rights. For example, industry-to-industry
compromises and market clearing institutions such as ASCAP-often
celebrated as a result of private ordering-do not arise spontaneously. A
closer look at what are often described as private ordering solutions
reveals significant and usually ongoing government participation,
provocation, and monitoring. The baseline allocation of property rights
is often just the beginning of a negotiating process. This Article
highlights the institutional context of copyright policymaking that is
sometimes ignored and often left unstated. Through a series of case
studies we demonstrate the multitude of government institutions that
can play a role in content-technology disputes, the ongoing nature of
government participation in these disputes, and the importance of
thinking about these disputes in informational terms.
Conflicts between content owners and technology developers are
often conceptualized as two-player games. 376 This simplified framework
can be a useful analytical tool in some circumstances, but it is
incomplete without an account of the role of government. In two-player
terms it is evident that inviting or resisting government intervention,
alternating between the two, or inviting one part of the government's
intervention while resisting another's, is a significant part of the strategy
set of both content owners and technology interests. Instead of thinking
of content-technology disputes as a two-player game with fixed rules,
scholars and policymakers should pay attention to the broader game
about what the rules will be. This game has at least three playerscontent, technology, and the state. Even when a content-technology
dispute becomes more or less settled, such as ASCAP's dispute with

376

See, e.g., Oliar,supra note 40.
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radio broadcasters, the government often remains involved as a
monitor.
The recent move by Clear Channel to bargain with record labels
perfectly demonstrates the way that government involvement can spur
private negotiations toward a solution. In June 2012, Clear Channel
reached a deal with one large, independent record label to pay
performance royalties for traditional AM and FM radio in return for
favorable rates on webcasting royalties.377 U.S. copyright law does not
currently contain a general public performance right, only a digital
one. 378 But Congress has considered bills to institute a general public
performance right with increasing frequency, and the bills have crept
closer to success. 379 In this context-the threat of new legislation-the
radio firm reached a deal with one company from the other side of the
dispute. Clear Channel CEO John Hogan said: "Well listen, I'm as big a
fan as the next guy of elected officials, but I think it's always a little scary
when you look for legislative or regulatory solutions to what should be
marketplace solutions."380 If only Hogan had read this Article, he would
see that a legislative tactic-considering legislation-appears to have
been instrumental in producing the conditions under which the
marketplace solution was reached.
The approach of granting broad copyright rights and specific
exemptions, which is so prevalent in the current Copyright Act, has
obvious defects from an informational perspective. Congress has no
information about the needs of new technologies and new business
models and as such can scarcely accommodate changing social needs.
This explains why much of the burden of accommodating new
technology has fallen on the few open-textured limits on copyright
owners' rights, such as the fair use doctrine or the scope of secondary
liability.381 Information problems are also a key issue in compulsory
licenses and tax-and-subsidy approaches to accommodating new
377 See Ed Christman, Exclusive: Clear Channel, Big Machine Strike Deal to Pay SoundRecording Performance Royalties to Label, Artists, BILLBOARD, June 5, 2012,
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/legal-and-management/exclusive-clear-channel-bigmachine-strike-1007226762.story (describing the deal, although not all terms were made
public).
378 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6) (2006).
379 See Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009); Performance Rights Act, H.R.
4789, 110th Cong. (2007). Congress did not pass the 2007 bill. See Laura E. Johannes, Hitting
the Right Notes: The Need for a GeneralPublic Performance Right in Sound Recordings to Create
Harmony in American Copyright Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 445, 462 (2011). The 2009 bill
was voted out of committee, but did not reach a floor vote. See Mary LaFrance, U.S.
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, BERKLEE C. MUSIC BUS. J., October 2011, at 1,
available at http://www.thembj.org/2011/10/u-s-performance-rights-in-sound-recordings/.
380 Glenn Peoples, Clear Channel's John Hogan Discusses Big Machine Royalty Deal at
Billboard Country Summit, BILLBOARD, June 5, 2012, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/
digital-and-mobile/clear-channel-s-john-hogan-discusses-big- 1007241352.story.
381 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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technology. To set an appropriate fee for a compulsory license, Congress
must either employ some mechanism to determine what that fee should
be or set the rate arbitrarily.
The recent controversy over the Google Books Settlement
illustrates our conclusions. Initially, the Google Library Project was
focused on data processing and search. Groups of authors and
publishers sued Google for scanning books without permission, alleging
violation of their reproduction rights. In 2008, Google, the Authors
Guild, and a group of leading publishing companies proposed a class
action settlement (later amended) which, among other things, would
have transformed the Google Library Project into a distribution
platform for electronic versions of books.382
The Amended Settlement Agreement (ASA) was seen as legislation
disguised as class action and an intrusion on the policy domain of
Congress.383 This is both an issue of democratic legitimacy and of
institutional capacity. Although courts are quick to invoke the dicta
from Sony that "deference to Congress" is required "when major
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials,"384
such incantations may reflect an exaggerated sense of modesty. Where
the correct application of existing law is ambiguous, contested, or both,
courts can and should make determinations of law in contenttechnology disputes involving individual parties, even if these disputes
will have industry wide ramifications.385 To give just three examples, in
cases relating to time-shifting, format-shifting, and file sharing, courts
have shown a great capacity to balance the needs of content owners,
technology developers, and the public at large.386 However, the ASA
would have gone further than the results in such cases. The ASA
implicated the rights of large numbers of companies and individuals
with diverse interests; the agreement went well beyond clarifying rights,
it actually rebalanced and reallocated them.387
Because the ASA was so far removed from the underlying litigation
and because its effects were cast so broadly, it was seen by the court, the
DOJ, the Copyright Office, and several prominent academics as an
undemocratic usurpation of the legislative function.388 The Register of
382 For more background on the controversy, see Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement
and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 20-23 (2010).
383 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
384 Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
385 See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
386 See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.
1999).
387 This is not an adverse comment on the merits of the substantive deal proposed under the
ASA.
388 See Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: The Proposed Google Book
Settlement Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Hon.
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Copyrights went as far as to say that the Copyright Office was "greatly
concerned by the parties' end run around legislative process and
prerogatives." Judge Chin agreed with these criticisms and held that,
with respect to orphan works at least, "the establishment of a
mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more suited for
Congress than this Court."389 The District Court concluded that it was
the wrong institution to decide the policy questions raised in the ASA,
partly because the class action mechanism was unlikely to generate
enough-or the right kinds of-information. The most significant issue
here was lack of representation of different author interests, especially
with respect to orphan works and academic authors.
The controversy over the Google Book Project also illustrates how
the analysis we have set out can be carried forward. A compulsory
license is one possible solution to the dispute among publishers, authors,
and Google. Our review of webcasting suggests significant risks in this
approach and how we could structure a regime to avoid them. The point
here is not to provide definitive solutions as to Google Books or any
other issue, but rather to show how an information-focused institutional
perspective generates insights that would be overlooked in a pure
property rights approach or a standard political economy approach.
Congress could create a compulsory license regime to facilitate
digitization-search, digitization-display, or both. This step would be
welcomed by many, but only if Congress learns the lessons from its
quite unsatisfactory experiences with webcasting.390 In this Article we
have raised some of the critical design questions without necessarily
fully resolving them. The basic design questions in any compulsory
license regime are, first, who receives compensation for what uses, and
second, at what price.
In terms of the first question, a decision must be made as to
whether copyright owners are entitled to compensation for purely nonMarybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Peters090910.pdf ("In the view of the Copyright Office, the settlement proposed by the parties
would encroach on responsibility for copyright policy that traditionally has been the domain of
Congress... We are greatly concerned by the parties' end run around legislative process and
prerogatives, and we submit that this Committee should be equally concerned."); Pamela
Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1308,
1358 (2010) ("Use of a class action settlement to restructure markets and to reallocate
intellectual property rights, particularly when it would give one firm a de facto monopoly to
commercialize millions of books, is arguably corrosive of fundamental tenets of our democratic
society.").
389 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("The
argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would
provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.
Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution." (quoting Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 628-29) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
390 We do not discount the possibility that reforming statutory damages might be a better
path to orphan works reform.
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expressive (or non-consumptive) uses of their works such as would be
entailed in digitization-search.391 One must also decide whether
compensation was required for snippet displays of the kind Google
currently uses to illustrate its search results. Like the digital audio
transmission right, a compulsory license regime for these activities
would (in our opinion) actually expand the rights of copyright owners
beyond current law. Alternatively, the compulsory license could simply
relate to digitization-distribution. The most likely version of this
proposal would be limited to orphan works or at least to works whose
owners do not affirmatively opt out of inclusion in digitizationdistribution databases.
Once the sphere of application of a compulsory license is
determined, the question of payment must be addressed. As we have
seen in the webcasting context, a badly designed rate-setting process can
have disastrous consequences. The design choices here range from a
simple fixed fee to a complex arbitration proceeding. The unhappy
experience of rate-setting through arbitration for webcasting suggests a
number of lessons going forward. First, a decision rule premised on
discovering the price that would be set by a hypothetical willing buyerwilling seller market is likely to generate arbitrary results. Given the
non-existent market for permissions in orphan works, a willing buyerwilling seller determination would be entirely speculative in this
context. This standard would also entirely fail to take account of the
public interest in improved access library collections and the public
interest in public domain works likely to be mistaken as orphan works.
As an alternative, rates could be determined with respect to reasonable
expectations, investment backed expectations, fair remuneration, or fair
profit-sharing. None of these standards is perfect, and whatever the
rate-setting mechanism turns out to be, an explicit consideration of the
public interest must surely feature prominently.
Second, the rate-setting process must be designed to encourage the
production and collection of useful information. The adversarial design
of Webcasting I, II and III left the CRJs (and the arbitrators before
them) reliant on the parties for information.392 This was a serious defect
in relation to webcasting because it pitted the deep institutional
expertise of the recording industry against a decentralized and emerging
industry. Relying on an adversarial process in relation to library
digitization would be no better than the ASA, which the court rejected

391 See Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607
(2009); Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012).
392 Webcasting III was conducted in an even more informationally impoverished
environment because the webcasters who accepted the PurePlay deal were not allowed to
participate.
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for its lack of proper representation. In the orphan works context, we
know by definition that certain important interests will not participate.
Third, although the facts are susceptible to multiple
interpretations, the balance of evidence suggests that the "agree or
arbitrate" framework of webcasting was a failure (or at best, a string of
failures followed by a success in the form of the PurePlay Settlement).
Moreover, given that the court was unwilling to trust private agreement
in the form of the ASA, it would seem inconsistent to trust private
agreement in an arbitration context. More importantly, without the
orphan works holders, there can be no agreement that binds all the
affected parties. From an information-focused perspective, one could
say that having the necessary information requires, at a minimum, the
participation of all interested parties.
The recent controversy over the Stop Online Piracy Act and the
Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA)393 illustrates the usefulness of
viewing government intervention as a multi-pronged effort of many
institutions that are often uncoordinated. SOPA and PIPA were
primarily copyright enforcement legislation, targeting foreign websites
and arguably targeting domestic, online intermediaries like credit card
companies who process online payments and online advertising
companies who sometimes profit from infringing sites. As with the
unsuccessful draft bills to deal with player pianos prior to the 1909 Act,
SOPA and PIPA were drafted without meaningful input from
technologists. In early 2012, technologists staged an Internet blackout
day, and the news frenzy was on. Former co-sponsors of the bills backed
down almost immediately.394 But picking up the story of getting credit
card companies and online advertising companies with Congress's role is
misleading. For over a decade since the DMCA, courts have determined
the reach and application of the section 512 safe harbors, allowing
intermediaries like credit card companies and online advertising
companies to avoid secondary liability.395 Meanwhile, just as Congress
was drafting and debating SOPA and PIPA, the Obama administration's
"copyright czar," Victoria Espinel, was negotiating voluntary
agreements to participate in copyright enforcement with those same
credit card companies and online advertising companies. 396 Perhaps the
success of those voluntary agreements should have been measured
before Congress pushed legislation.

393 Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2011); Protect Intellectual
Property Act of 2011, S. 986, 112th Cong. § 6(b).

394 See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against the Old,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, at Al.
395 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Visa Int'l Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007).

396 See supranote 115 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 246 2012

2012]

INFORMATION-GATHERING APPROACH

247

On the issue of online enforcement, it is too soon to tell whether
this multi-pronged intervention will be successful in pushing the private
parties to negotiate a solution, or alternatively whether a governmentimposed solution will be crafted successfully. But it is essential to regard
the government's role in the dispute between copyright owners and
online intermediaries as involving multiple government institutions
from all three branches. From that starting point, one can ask what we
view as a crucial question: which government institution, or
combination of institutions, is most likely to elicit the information one
would need to resolve the dispute and reach a socially beneficial
solution? In this Article, we hope to have demonstrated the usefulness of
asking that question when content-technology disputes arise.
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